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Computer and network security is a complex problem and one that is not solely
restricted to classified computer systems and networks. Accelerating trends in networking
and the emphasis on open and interoperable networks has left many unclassified systems
vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks. Computer and network professionals must
understand the scope of security, recognize the need for security for even unclassified
systems and then take steps to protect their systems.
Transmission of static passwords in plaintext over the Internet is one of the most
widely publicized network vulnerabilities. One-time password mechanisms (such as S-Key)
or other secure network access mechanisms (such as Kerberos) have been recommended to
improve access security for computer systems connected to the Internet.
This thesis examines many of the issues that must be addressed when assessing the
need for computer and network security. This work provides the results of a site security
survey for the unclassified IP/ATM LAN in the Systems Technology Lab at the Naval
Postgraduate School. These results highlight new security vulnerabilities and strengths that
occur when standard Internet Protocol (IP) local-area networks (LANs) are internetworked
with Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) wide-area networks (WANs). Finally, we
examine the feasibility of the Kerberos authentication protocol for remote plaintext password
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Computer and network security is a complex problem and one that is no longer
unique to classified networks. The Internet and interaetworked computer systems in
general offer incredible financial, educational, scientific and recreational opportunities.
While the ease with which individuals and organizations are able to transmit and retrieves
data and information around the world is certainly attractive, it does not come without
pitfalls. Threats to computer system security and network security abound. The problem
faced by many organizations, including the Department of Defense (DoD), is being able
to take advantage of this global internetworking trend without compromising proprietary
or sensitive information, or falling prey to malicious attacks against the normal operation
of their networked computer systems.
Personal data, credit card numbers, proprietary business information and sensitive
research data must be protected both while stored in host systems and while being
transmitted over the network. Many people believe that new networking technologies
such as Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) will significantly reduce the threats to
networked computer system security. However, current networking technology will
remain in place for the foreseeable future. Regardless of whether the physical technology
and protocols used for the Internet backbone are based on routed IP packets or switched
ATM circuits, internetworking trends will continue. We are beginning to see
internetworked hybrids of both approaches, along with a need for a keener focus on
computer and network security.
Computer and network security is primarily a management issue, one that
historically has been a low priority. Managers must understand internetworking trends
and the threats to networked computer system security. They must recognize the need to
secure even unclassified networks. This thesis focuses on the security threats and
vulnerabilities associated with internetworking a Internet Protocol (IP) local-area network
(LAN) and an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) wide-area network (WAN) at the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
B. MOTIVATION
1. Growth of the Internet
The incredible growth of the Internet and the technological advances in modern
computer network communications has made global communication and information
interchange a reality. Individual and organizational computer systems are accessible to
millions of other computers and individuals where they were once relatively sheltered.
Over the past 25 years the Internet has experienced incredible growth. Table l 1 shows
that in the last year alone, the number of computer hosts connected to the Internet has
nearly doubled and the number of networks, as indicated by the Network Class figures,
has more than doubled (Lottor, 1996). These statistics should be considered minimums
due to incomplete data collection as discussed in (Lottor, 1 992).
1 Data in Tables 1 and 2 were produced by Network Wizards and is used by permission.
The original survey data are available at http://www.nw.com/
Date Hosts Domains Network Class
A B C
Jan 96 9,472,000 240,000 92 5655 87,924
Jul 95 6,642,000 120,000 91 5390 56,057
Jan 95 4,852,000 71,000 91 4979 34,340
Table 1. Number of hosts, domains and networks advertised in the Domain
Name System (DNS). After (Lottor, 1996).
While the Internet was initially implemented in the 1970's as a demonstration
project using new networking technology for the U.S. Government (Rowe, 1995; Krol,
1994; Claffy, et al., 1994), Table 2 shows that the Internet now connects millions of
computers on tens of thousands of networks belonging to governments, organizations,
















Table 2. Host distribution by top-level domain
name (Lottor, 1996).
DoD use of the Internet also continues to increase. The U.S. DoD (i.e. the mil
domain) ranks tenth with regard to the number of hosts connected to the Internet, and the
Pentagon continues working to take advantage of internetworking capabilities and
emerging technologies. All of the military services emphasize the need for integrating
computer and communication networks and for using cutting edge technology (Sullivan,
1995; CNO, 1995; Fogleman and Widnall, 1995). These integrated networks (or at least
the information they transport) will need to be secure to be effectively used by the mili-
tary commander in the field (Nierle, 1996).
2. The Need for Computer Security
The need for computer and network security is obvious when speaking about
classified defense information or when viewed from a national defense perspective.
However, although NPS is a military installation, its mission is not to provide national
defense but to enhance it by providing graduate and professional education for U.S. and
allied military officers (NPS, 1995). IfNPS only has an indirect effect on national
security, why should it (or any other educational institution) be concerned with computer
system and network security? Why should business and industry (aside from those
defense contractors developing classified technology) be concerned with networked
computer system security? These questions deserve analysis.
The original "Internet," which consisted initially of the DoD's Advanced Research
Project Agency Network (ARPANet) and later the National Science Foundation Network
of supercomputers (NSFNET), was developed primarily to allow collaborating research-
ers to exchange files and electronic mail messages among one another. To this day, the
Internet is essential for collaborative research among academia. industry and the military,
but the Internet user community is no longer composed strictly of benevolent academi-
cians and researchers exchanging data and communications for the good of science.
Banking services, electronic commerce, international business transactions and a host of
commercial on-line services all compete for network bandwidth. (Krol, 1994; Boucher,
1994) Not all Internet users are model citizens; some seek to exploit system and network
weaknesses either out of malice or else for personal or professional gain.
These malicious users are not necessarily external to one's own organization.
Statistics show that external attacks account for less than 3% of reported losses while
malicious insiders account for approximately 19% and mistakes made by well-intentioned
insiders account for approximately 65% of reported losses (Wong and Watt, 1990).
Therefore the networked computer system security umbrella must protect an organization
against threats from inside as well as outside the organization. The important point is that
even if only 0.01% of the estimated 20 million Internet users (Blum, 1995-1996;
Boucher, 1994) is attempting to gain unauthorized access or otherwise cause damage to
your computer systems/networks or the data they contain, whether they are inside or
outside your organization, there are still 20,000 wolves at the door. The most frightening
aspect of these wolves is that they can be at more than one networked door at a time, they
can use a variety of techniques to gain access to computer systems, and their actions can
have long-lasting effects.
If the mere possibility of a computer security incident doesn't convince computer
system users, administrators and managers of the need for computer security, the
applicable laws and regulations should. Table 3 lists a number of laws and directives that
are relevant to this thesis. These laws and directive proscribe various security require-
ments for federal computer systems. The following bullets briefly describe each of these
laws and directives.
• The Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted largely in response to growing
public concern over the privacy of personal information gathering in
various government databases in the early 1 970's (Russell and Gangemi,
1991).
• Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71 requires federal
agencies under the jurisdiction of the executive branch to establish and
maintain computer security programs (Russell and Gangemi, 1991; DoN,
1991).
• OMB Circular A- 130 (Management of Federal Information Resources,
1985) extended the A-71 requirement to all federal agencies.
• The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-474; amend-
ment to title 18 U.S. Code, section 1030) was enacted to combat the
growing number of computer crimes in the early 1980's— crimes that cost
federally insured financial institutions an estimated $730 million in 1985.
This act also prohibits unauthorized access to computer systems owned or
operated by or on behalf of the Federal Government. (Toensing, 1986).
• The Computer Security Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-235) requires all
U.S. government computer systems containing sensitive information to
have a customized security plan (Russell and Gangemi, 1991; DoN, 1991).
• The Privacy Act of 1 974
• OMB Circular A-71
• OMB Circular A- 130
• The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986
• The Computer Security Act of 1987
• DoD Directive 5200.28
• SECNAVINST 5239.2
Table 3. Relevant laws and directives governing
computer security.
• Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5200.28 "Security Requirements
for Automated Information Systems (AISs)" outlines the security require-
ments for all automated information systems operated by or for the DoD
(SPAWAR, 1993; DoN, 1991).
• Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5239.2 "Department of
the Navy Automated Information Systems" provides specific guidelines
that apply to automated information systems operated by or for the Depart-
ment of the Navy (SPAWAR, 1993; DoN, 1991).
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
There are two primary objectives for this thesis. The first objective is to docu-
ment the results of a site security survey for the unclassified IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS
and identify areas that are deficient. The second objective is to provide a secure remote
login capability to the IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS for mobile users and for research
partners at Old Dominion University in Norfolk Virginia.
D. THESIS STRUCTURE
1. Scope
An overwhelming variety of subjects might be examined when studying net-
worked computer security. We have focused on practical and experimentally verifiable
issues of immediate interest. The scope of this thesis is limited to a discussion of the
security issues relevant to the integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS, documenting the
results of a site security survey for the IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS, and implementing
and testing the Kerberos authentication and authorization protocol to improve remote user
access security of the IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS.
2. Organization
This introductory chapter defines the general problem and explains the motivation
for the research described and documented in this thesis. Chapter II presents background
information necessary to understand the remainder of this work and describes some
related internetworking and networked computer system security research. Chapter III
presents a detailed problem statement. Chapter IV discusses many of the issues that
managers must address when determining the type and extent of controls required to
adequately secure their networked computer system. Chapter V describes the Kerberos
authentication and authorization protocol. Chapter VI documents the results of a site
security survey for the IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS. Chapter VII describes the steps
taken to implement the Kerberos software in the NPS Systems Technology Lab (STL).
Research conclusions and recommendations for further work are presented in Chapter
VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides background information and briefly discusses related inter-
networking and computer security research. Section B defines the concepts and purpose
of computer security for our context. Section C discusses the International Standards
Organization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) logical reference model for
network communications and how computer security can be implemented within the
framework of the OSI model. The Internet protocol model is briefly discussed and
contrasted with the OSI model in Section D. A general discussion ofATM, its relation-
ship to the Internet model and its vulnerabilities with regard to security is provided in
Section E. The chapter concludes with a discussion of related internetworking and
security research in Section F.
B. COMPUTER SECURITY BACKGROUND
Computer security is a broad subject. Before we can discuss the subject we must
first define precisely what it is we are discussing. Subsection 1 defines computer security
and explains its purpose. Subsection 2 describes the Department of the Navy's computer
security program (DoN, 1991). Subsection 3 clarifies the terms threat, vulnerability, risk
and control as used in the context of networked computer security.
1. Definition and Purpose
Ask ten different computer professionals for the definition and purpose of
computer security and you are likely to receive ten different variations on a theme. The
following quotations serve to illustrate this point.
"[Computer security is] the protection of the computer resources against
accidental or intentional disclosure of confidential data, unlawful mod-
ification of data or programs, the destruction of data, software or hard-
ware, and the denial of one's own computer facilities . . .." (Palmer and
Potter, 1989, pg. 12)
"[Computer security is] the protection of . . . systems and their data,
against any accidental or deliberate compromise of proprietary data and
programs . . . and assuring their continuous availability to users . .
.
through built-in system resilience features to minimise short term disrup-
tions, and contingency planning, to mitigate protracted system stoppage
from natural or man-made disasters." (Wong and Watt, 1990, pg. 23)
Computer security is the protection of your "computer and everything
associated with it . . .." (Russell and Gangemi, 1991)
Even the military services do not agree precisely on what computer security is. The U.S.
Air Force defines computer security as the protection of information confidentiality,
integrity and availability (Fleming, 1993), while the U.S. Navy defines automated
information system (AIS) security as the policies and procedures taken to "protect AISs
against unauthorized (accidental or intentional) destruction, modification, disclosure and
denial of service" (DoN, 1991, para. 1.1).
Despite subtle variations in the definitions given above, each is an appropriate
definition of computer security. Nevertheless some concepts are more appropriate than
others for today's internetworked computing environment. Where once computer security
focused on securing access to a central mainframe computer, security in today's
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distributed computing environment requires a much broader scope. One cannot consider
the security of an individual computer without considering the security of the information
that is processed by that computer regardless of whether the information is stored on the
computer itself or on a secondary storage device. Likewise in the case of networked
computers, one cannot consider computer and information security without considering
the security of the network over which the information is transmitted. (Cobb, 1992;
Baskerville, 1988; Reeves, 1983)
This thesis focuses on a local-area network (LAN) owned and operated by the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and therefore uses the computer security definition
outlined in the Department of the Navy (DoN) Automated Information Systems (AIS)
Security Guidelines (DoN, 1991). The definition applies to the hardware, the software
and the data, regardless of whether such data is in storage, is being processed by the
central processing unit or is being transmitted over a network. Thus the terms automated
information system (AIS) security, system/network security and internetworked computer
security are used interchangeably throughout the remainder of this thesis.
2. DoN AIS Security Guidelines
The Department of the Navy divides its overall security program into seven inter-
dependent elements. These elements are shown in Table 4. Although each element is
described and governed by a separate instruction, all categories overlap to a great extent.
For example, the DoN AIS Security Guidelines (the first element in Table 4) document
the roles, responsibilities and requirements for ensuring adequate information security,




















Table 4. DoN security program elements
(DoN, 1991, para. 1.5).
emanations security as each applies to automated information systems (AISs). Although
it may seem that some of these elements are meaningless outside the context of AISs,
each individual element does in fact encompass a much broader scope.
The primary purpose of the DoN AIS Security Guidelines is to assist Navy
commands and "activities in meeting the intent of the DoN AIS Security policies"
(emphasis added) (DoN, 1991, para. 1 .4). Some readers may argue that the list in Table 4
is incomplete in that it does not include system availability. This is indeed an important
factor of computer security as discussed in Chapter IV. However, although the list does
not explicitly include it, system availability is implicitly considered in the risk analysis
methodology outlined in the guidelines.
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The DoN AIS Security Guidelines are not merely an implementation checklist.
They are a management tool commanding officers or other responsible individuals can
use to determine the required level of security for the activity's AISs. The guidelines
provide a methodology and sample documentation that commands and activities can use,
both to analyze the security of their AISs and to determine if adequate threat controls are
in place to operate those AISs at an acceptable level of risk. What constitutes the
appropriate amount of security and the acceptable level of risk are management decisions
that will vary from system to system.
3. Threats, Vulnerabilities, Risks and Controls
Whichever definition is chosen, AIS security is the art of mitigating threats by
eliminating or reducing system vulnerabilities through the application of controls in order
to minimize threat impact and the risk of loss. Unfortunately these three terms— threat,
vulnerability and risk— are used often indiscriminately. For example, the DoN AIS
Security Guidelines treat the terms "threat" and "vulnerability" synonymously. However,
the three terms are clearly distinct. The following paragraphs define these terms.
Threats are possible pitfalls or dangers confronting an information system, no
matter how likely or unlikely they may be. For example, fire is a threat to overall
information system security. In accordance with our definition of AIS security, fire can
result in damaged or destroyed hardware/software/data or denial of system services.
(Fitzgerald, 1993; Russell and Gangemi, 1991) As with fire, threats need not be directed
at or against the information system per se, but may simply be a product of the
13
environment that could cause coincidental damage to the system. A threat corresponds to
a system vulnerability only in the absence of adequate proactive controls.
A vulnerability represents a security weakness in the system that might result in a
potential loss if that weakness is exploited by a threat (Fitzgerald, 1993; Fleming, 1993;
Russell and Gangemi, 1991 ; Wong and Watt, 1990; Palmer and Potter, 1989). The
frequency at which a threat may occur is not a factor when determining system vulnera-
bilities. For example, if an information system does not have an operative or adequate
fire suppression system or other fire protection mechanism, this lack of fire protection is a
system vulnerability no matter how rarely a fire may actually occur. (Wong and Watt,
1990)
Risk is a measure of the possible impact or loss that may result if a threat actually
exploits a system vulnerability. The level of risk will depend on the controls in place, the
value of the assets affected and the likelihood that the threat will actually occur. (Cobb,
1992; Wong and Watt, 1990; Palmer and Potter, 1989; DoN, 1991)
Controls are the countermeasures, protection mechanisms or safeguards imple-
mented to counter threats to a system and to reduce the risk of loss. Traditionally controls
have one of three purposes: prevention, detection or correction. Preventative controls are
designed to prevent or hinder a threat from occurring. Detective controls are designed to
alert users and/or system administrators if a particular threat or event occurs. Corrective
controls are designed to assist users and/or system administrators in recovering after a
threat or event occurs. (Fitzgerald, 1993; Russell and Gangemi, 1991; Wong and Watt,
1990;Baskerville, 1988)
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Now that computer security has been defined, its purpose explained and some
frequently misunderstood terms clarified, a brief discussion of network communication
protocols is in order. The next three sections briefly discuss the ISO OSI reference
model, the Internet protocol (TCP/IP) suite and emerging Asynchronous Transfer Mode
(ATM) technology.
C. ISO OSI REFERENCE MODEL
It seems almost canonical that any discussion of networking must include a
discussion of the International Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnec-
tion (OSI) logical reference model for network and data communications. While it is
important to have a basic understanding of the functionality associated with each layer in
the OSI model, one must realize that the model is only conceptual. It is not an implemen-
tation guide. The OSI model merely provides a convenient way for researchers, techni-
cians and computer professionals to discuss network functionality. Subsection 1
describes the functionality of each layer of the OSI model and Subsection 2 describes the
security services associated with each layer of the model.
1. Network Functionality in the OSI Model
The ISO OSI logical reference model is shown in Figure 1. Each layer of the OSI
model outlines a particular function with regard to data and network communications.
The bottom three layers— the physical layer, the data link layer and the network
layer— work together to actually access the network and get the data onto the "wires."
The physical layer is responsible for bit encoding (i.e. transforming binary code into the










Figure 1. ISO OSI reference model.
making the physical, electrical and/or mechanical connection to the physical medium and
is concerned with transmitting and receiving the data stream onto and from the network.
The data link layer is responsible for point-to-point message synchronization and
integrity and is concerned with encapsulating the data into data units and calculating error
checksums. The network layer is responsible for efficient routing across a switched
network and is concerned with logical-to-physical address resolution. (Fitzgerald, 1993;
Russell and Gangemi, 1991; Wong and Watt, 1990)
The top four layers— the transport layer, the session layer, the presentation layer
and the application layer— work together to establish a connection and to format the data
for presentation to the lower three layers. The transport layer is responsible for end-to-
end data integrity, message assembly/disassembly and connection management. The
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session layer is responsible for establishing and maintaining the connection for a
particular communication session. The presentation layer is responsible for formatting
data for user applications and other devices on the network. Finally, the application layer
is responsible for application software (e.g. ftp, word processing etc.) and the end user's
interface to the network. (Fitzgerald, 1993; Russell and Gangemi, 1991; Wong and Watt,
1990)
2. Security in the OSI Model
There are five basic security services described by the ISO Security Architecture
that can be implemented in any network. These services are authentication, access
control, data confidentiality (i.e. secrecy), data integrity and nonrepudiation (ISO 7498-2-
1988(E)). Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of a user or computer
process acting on behalf of a user. Access control (i.e. authorization) is the process of
enforcing the authorized use of or access to programs, processes and data by users or
computer processes acting on behalf of users. Integrity implies that there has been no
accidental or intentional unauthorized modification or destruction of data. Confidentiality
implies that there has been no accidental or intentional unauthorized disclosure of data.
Nonrepudiation is the process of protecting against denial of receipt or transmission of
data by the receiver or sender respectively. (McNulty, 1994; Russell and Gangemi, 1991;
Kirkpatrick, 1989) The goal of these five security services then is to prevent
unauthorized disclosure, destruction or modification of data, or denial of system services
in accordance with our definition of AIS security (DoN, 1991).
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With the exception of the session layer, each notional layer in the OSI model can
support one or more of these security services. Figure 2 illustrates the security services
that each layer can support. The physical layer can support data confidentiality using end-
to-end encryption protocols. The data link layer can also support data confidentiality by
using link-by-link rather than end-to-end encryption protocols. The network and
transport layers can each support authentication, access control, data confidentiality and
data integrity. The presentation layer can support data confidentiality. The OSI applica-
tion layer can support all five security services. (Buddenberg, 1995; Russell and




Presentation Layer: Data Confidentiality
Session Layer:
Transport Layer: Authentication, Access Control
Confidentiality, Data Integrity
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Physical Layer: Data Confidentiality
Figure 2. Security services in the OSI Reference Model. After
(Kirkpatrick, 1989).
Gangemi, 1991 ; Kirkpatrick, 1989) It is important to note that the OSI security architec-
ture only discusses the services each layer can support; it says nothing about which
services each layer should support.
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D. INTERNET PROTOCOLS
As mentioned in Section C, the OSI reference model is largely notional. Actual
network technology and protocol implementations do not map neatly to the OSI
conceptual model, yet actual implementations still provide essentially the same overall
functionality. Subsection 1 below presents a brief discussion of the common TCP/IP
protocol suite and how it maps onto the OSI reference model. Subsection 2 discusses
computer security in the Internet model.
1. Network Functionality in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
The TCP/IP protocol suite is composed of four conceptual layers: the network
interface layer, the network or Internet layer, the transport layer and the application layer.
Figure 3 illustrates how these layers map onto the OSI model. Although the figure shows
a smooth mapping, one must realize that it is not necessarily a direct mapping; there is
some functional overlap between the layers of the OSI model and those of the TCP/IP
suite. A significant further difference is that protocols following the OSI reference model
are constrained to communicate only with adjacent layers, whereas interlayer communica-
tions in the TCP/IP suite are allowed to bypass layers when necessary for efficiency,
responsiveness and throughput (Stallings, 1994).
The network access layer in the TCP/IP suite combines most of the functionality
of the OSI physical and data link layers. However, where the OSI model includes link-
by-link error control at the data link layer, the TCP/IP protocol stack treats error control
as an end-to-end problem in the transport layer. The network access layer is responsible
for accepting IP datagrams from the network layer, encapsulating them in network
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Figure 3. Comparison of the TCP/IP protocol suite and the OSI model.
After (Varma, 1995).
specific frames and transmitting them over the network. The TCP/IP network access
layer may consist of a simple device driver or it may implement its own complex data
link protocol. (Comer, 1991)
The IP network layer (also known as the Internet layer) provides functionality
similar to that described for the OSI network layer. However, the OSI model only
describes functionality associated with a single network; it does not address internet-
working as does the TCP/IP implementation. The IP network layer accepts packets from
the transport layer, encapsulates them as Internet Protocol (IP) datagrams and passes the
IP datagrams to the network access layer. (Comer, 1991)
As mentioned above, the TCP/IP transport layer provides end-to-end error control
and other functionality similar to the OSI transport layer. Protocols in this layer include
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the connection-oriented Transport Control Protocol (TCP) (Postel, 1981) and the
connectionless User Datagram Protocol (UDP) (Postel, 1980). The TCP/IP transport
layer may also implement some OSI session layer connection management functionality
in those instances where TCP is implemented. (Comer, 1991)
Finally, the TCP/IP application layer combines the functionality described for the
OSI session, presentation and application layers. In the TCP/IP implementation, the
application layer is responsible for determining whether the data is to be transmitted as a
data stream or as data messages (Comer, 1991).
2. Security in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
The TCP/IP protocol suite is a set of interoperable protocols for use in an open
environment. For this and historical reasons, the current version (IPv4) protocols
themselves are inherently insecure. The current TCP/IP protocols do not prevent
someone at an intermediate node between source and destination nodes from capturing
and viewing, modifying, destroying, spoofing or redirecting datagrams as they pass by on
the network.
Many tradeoffs pertain when implementing security in practice. The primary
focus for security in the TCP/IP model is at the application layer (Baker et ah, 1996).
Implementing security in higher layers typically requires a smaller Trusted Computing
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Base (TCB)2 to enforce a particular security policy. Generally a smaller TCB facilitates
scalability and reduces security related costs.
Despite the inherent insecurity of the current Internet protocols, they do support
some security functions. For example, the transport layer incorporates an integrity check-
sum in the transport control protocol (TCP) packets and data confidentiality can be
supported at either the network or application layer using cryptography (Comer, 1991).
Access control can also be supported at the application or network layer with address
filtering or access control lists.
Security requirements have changed as the Internet has migrated from primarily a
research and development tool to encompass a much broader user base. The IP Security
Protocol (IPSEC) working group within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has
developed cryptographic security protocol specifications to support combinations of
access control, authentication, confidentiality and integrity at the network layer (Hughes,
1996; Atkinson, 1995). 3 These specifications have been incorporated into the next-
generation Internet protocol (IPv6) (Bradner and Mankin, 1996; Huitema, 1996; Nierle,
1996). While the specifications are compatible with current IPv4 protocols, they are not
widely used (Huitema, 1996).
2 The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is the "totality of protection mechanisms within a
computer system— including hardware, firmware, and software— the combination of which is
responsible for enforcing a security policy" (DoD, 1985).
3
Refer to Section F later in this chapter for a discussion of the IETF. Information on
the IPSEC working group and their work can be found at http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-
charter. html
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E. ASYNCHRONOUS TRANSFER MODE
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is an emerging transport and switching
technology for use in broadband digital communications. It offers the possibility of
transmitting a variety of media formats at speeds ranging from a few megabits per second
to gigabits per second. A good overview of the technology is in (Partridge, 1994) and an
in-depth discussion can be found in (Alles, 1991). This section serves only to introduce
the reader to how ATM compares to the TCP/IP protocol stack and to provide an
overview of security as it applies to ATM. A detailed study integrating ATM with LAN
and WAN connectivity at NPS is documented in (Courtney, 1996).
1. Internet Protocol (IP) and ATM
IP and ATM are fundamentally different. IP is a connectionless technology
whereas ATM is a connection-oriented technology. Current ATM research and imple-
mentations focus on combining existing IP protocols and immature ATM protocols.
Figure 4 illustrates how ATM network services and protocols roughly map onto the
TCP/IP protocol suite.
The physical layer in the ATM protocol model is still responsible for bit encoding,
but the ATM layer combines the functionality of the OSI data link and network layers for
converting data link and higher layer protocols (such as TCP and IP) into ATM specific
protocols (Alles, 1991). The ATM Adaptation Layer (AAL) is responsible for segmenta-
tion and reassembly of the data stream. The AAL also handles multiplexing and cell loss
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ATM can be implemented over a variety of physical media. ATM is
envisioned as the next-generation broadband digital transmission method, usually run
using Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) protocol over optical fiber. There may be
a tendency to assume optical fiber is inherently secure. While it is true that some forms
of attack are more difficult with fiber optic links (line tapping for example), attacks are
not impossible.
There also may be a tendency to assume that "packet-sniffing" is not
possible in an ATM network because ATM is a connection-oriented technology and cell
switching occurs in hardware rather than software. This also is not true. ATM is
vulnerable to many of the same types of attack that have befallen the Internet community,
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specifically eavesdropping (i.e. packet/cell-sniffing). Cell-sniffing was demonstrated by
MCNC4 using the same techniques used for IP packet-sniffing. MCNC connected a
traffic analyzer to an ATM switch and captured login sequences (i.e. user IDs and
passwords) traversing the network (Stevenson et al, 1995). While this may not be a
significant vulnerability for a local-area network (LAN) where all switching hardware is
physically controlled by an organization, it can be quite significant for "logical" local-
area networks (i.e. those sharing the same address space) that are spread over a wide area,
and for wide-area networks (WANs) that use the public ATM network infrastructure
which is not controlled by a single organization. (Pucher et al, 1996; Stevenson et al,
1995)
In addition to the cell-sniffing vulnerability, ATM is vulnerable to
masquerading attacks. The ATM signaling protocol does not implement a way to ensure
the authenticity of a user accessing a system. The calling party ID field in the SETUP
signaling message is optional and is supplied by the calling party. The called party has no
way of ensuring the accuracy of the information in the calling party ID field and therefore
has no way of ensuring the authenticity of the calling party. (Stevenson et al, 1995)
ATM is also vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. The RESTART
signaling message can be used to deallocate bandwidth resources associated with any
4 MCNC is a "nonprofit corporation that develops and applies advanced electronic and
information technologies for business, university research, government, and education for
economic development" within North Carolina. MCNC is the corporation's legal name, not an
acronym. The MCNC Mission Statement is available at
http://www. mcnc. org/HTML/welcome. html
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Virtual Circuit (VC) specified in the message, including every active VC for another user.
The standard signaling protocol does not require proof of identity for the user issuing the
request. (Stevenson et al, 1995)
b. Proposed Security Services
Recognizing the vulnerabilities in ATM, researchers have recently begun
investigating ways to include security services in the lower-level ATM protocols.
Researchers now recommend that authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality and
cryptographic key distribution be implemented in lower-level ATM protocol standards.
Proposed ATM security standards recommend that data integrity be supported at the AAL
level and that authentication, cryptographic key distribution and confidentiality be
supported at the ATM layer. It also is recognized that these security services are required
not only for the data stream, but for signaling and network management messages as well.
(Chuang, 1995; Peyravian and Herreweghen, 1995)
Recommending inclusion of data integrity at the AAL layer rather than the
ATM layer is due to overhead limitations in the individual data cells. An ATM cell is
only 53 bytes long: 48 bytes for the data payload and 5 bytes for header information
(Peyravian and Herreweghen, 1995; Varma, 1995; Partridge, 1994). Increasing the
header size to include an integrity checksum would necessarily reduce the cell's data
payload. Such a change might result in an unacceptable reduction in data throughput
(Peyravian and Herreweghen, 1 995).
Recommendations for including authentication, data confidentiality and
cryptographic key distribution at the ATM level are described for three scenarios in
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(Peyravian and Herreweghen, 1995). The first scenario calls for security services from
one ATM end-node to another ATM end-node across a public (or private) network. The
second scenario calls for security services from an ATM end-node to an ATM switch on
the border of a public (or private) network. The third scenario calls for security services
between border switches residing on separate public (or private) networks. These
scenarios are shown in Figure 5. (Peyravian and Herreweghen, 1995)
The specification defining the proposed security standards for these
scenarios is scheduled to be published by The ATM Forum in mid 1997 (Sheth, 1996).
(A discussion of The ATM Forum and their efforts is included in the next section.)
However, previous experience with the closed nature of the ATM Forum indicates this
estimate may be optimistic. As a result, such proposed standards and corresponding
delays in implementation will not be of immediate use to the NPS ATM LAN. Further-
more, even if the ATM Forum remains on schedule, the specifications are likely to be
incomplete as closed-door security reviews typically overlook crucial issues that are only
revealed through widespread critique and discussion. That ATM security problems are
not widespread at present is probably due to the immaturity ofATM technology, in-
compatibility among ATM switches even during normal operations and the lack of
widespread knowledge or use of ATM. These problems are documented in detail in
(Courtney, 1996). Thus all aspects ofATM security need to be considered suspect for the
foreseeable future. Interested readers should consult the ATM Forum to remain up-to-









(a) Scenario 1: end-to-end security services.
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(b) Scenario 2: security services from end-node to switch.
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(c) Scenario 3: security services between switches.
Figure 5. Categories of forthcoming proposed security service implementations in
ATM networks. After (Peyravian and Herreweghen, 1995).
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F. RELATED WORK
This section identifies related research being conducted in internetworking and
computer security. Subsection 1 examines the impact of an important network computing
security thesis at NPS. Subsection 2 highlights the research being done by the Informa-
tion Infrastructure Research Group (IIRG) at NPS. Subsection 3 provides an introduction
to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and its work. Subsection 4 introduces the
ATM Forum and its research. Subsection 5 briefly explains the Information Wide-Area
Year (I-WAY) high-performance-computing project. A short discussion of (IPv6) is
presented in Subsection 6. This section concludes in Subsection 7 with a description of
some additional related NPS research projects.
1. Unix System Security Analysis
Unix Security: A Penetration Analysis ofNavy Computer Systems (Rich, 1992)
examines and documents vulnerabilities associated with a number of U.S. Navy net-
worked Unix computer systems connected to the Internet. This thesis examines six well-
know, well-documented Unix security vulnerabilities and demonstrates the ease with
which those vulnerabilities can be exploited. This thesis documents the results from
security sweeps of four Navy commands. While this thesis does indicate permission was
obtained from each command prior to the sweep, it does not indicate if the responsible
system administration managers were notified prior to the sweep. Such secretive "at-
tacks" have been permitted at NPS. If the purpose of such secretive "attacks" is to
discover existing system vulnerabilities system administrators need to be notified. Even
if the purpose of such secretive "attacks" is to test the effectiveness of system
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administrator training in a realistic setting, this practice unnecessarily burdens already
heavily tasked system administrators since they can end up chasing the proverbial "wild
goose" in their attempts to isolate and track down the intruder.
The strength of this thesis is in its recommendations for a simplistic Unix
security model, a model that was largely ignored until after the December 1995 NPS
security incident. Unfortunately access to the thesis is limited to the DoD and DoD
contractors simply because it documents computer system security vulnerabilities even
though the vulnerabilities are well-documented in other sources, (Curry, 1 990) for
example. Limiting access to reports such as this is a misguided attempt at improving
system security by keeping quite and hoping intruders are ignorant about common
vulnerabilities. Limiting access to this particular thesis no doubt contributed to the
successful NPS break-in in December 1995.
2. Information Infrastructure Research Group (IIRG)
This thesis is one of several master's theses being written as a result of cooperative
research into ATM and other broadband networking technology applications by the
Information Infrastructure Research Group (IIRG) at NPS (IIRG, 1996). The following
sections provide a brief overview of other work being done, identifying how networked
computer security applies to each area of research.
a. Automated Local and Global Network Monitoring
Internetworking: Automated Local and Global Network Monitoring
(Edwards, 1996) evaluates existing public domain network monitoring tools. The tools
are evaluated on IP and ATM LANs and WANs.
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Network monitoring includes the analysis of message transmission time
and routing. These include some of the same types of tools used by Cliff Stoll and his
colleagues at the Lawrence Berkeley Labs to track down a band of West German hackers
in the early 1980's (Stoll, 1989). Just as Stoll discovered during his hacker hunt, this
thesis recognizes the complexity of large-scale internetworks and the problems associated
with administration and monitoring of those networks.
A variety of both commercial and public-domain tools exist to aid system
administrators. Unfortunately, commercial tools are prohibitively expensive. On the
other hand, public-domain software tools are often difficult to understand and use. The
goal of this thesis is to integrate various public domain software tools into a single
automated easy-to-use network monitoring package that can provide network administra-
tors the network status and performance information they need.
Security considerations summarized in this thesis include using automatic
scripts accessible via home pages to remotely monitor network status. The monitoring
scripts can also automatically e-mail or page system administrators to inform them of
network problems.
b. ATM Local-Area Network (LAN)
Internetworking: The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) ATM Local-Area
Network (LAN) (Courtney, 1996) discusses ATM LAN configuration and compatibility
issues and documents the steps taken to develop a simple ATM LAN at NPS.
The objective of this project is to create, test and build an electronic
information infrastructure at NPS based on ATM cell relay that will enable research work
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in tele-education, telescience experiments and digital interactive multimedia. This thesis
lays the groundwork for future ATM work by sending real-time audio, video and graphics
across campus and around Monterey Bay over ATM circuits.
The primary security considerations highlighted in this thesis are system
availability issues associated with multi-vendor hardware and software incompatibility.
This is a prototype project and therefore known security problems have not prevented
careful implementation, testing and evaluation. It is recommended that the security
vulnerabilities and issues associated with ATM (discussed earlier in this chapter) will be
addressed prior to any operational implementation.
c. Multicast andATM Network Prerequisitesfor Distance Learning
Internetworking: Multicast and ATM Network Prerequisitesfor Distance
Learning (Tamer, 1996) investigates simple and cost-effective ways to configure and use
the Internet multicast backbone (MBone) and related software tools to provide adequate
audio and video quality over the Internet as well as ATM networks where available. This
research develops an inexpensive and easy-to-learn method for implementing and
operating an MBone classroom facility. This thesis outlines the steps required to
configure MBone audio/video recording tools to allow educational institutions with
limited budgets (most notably K-12 schools) the opportunity to take advantage of the
potential educational benefits offered by the MBone.
This thesis also investigates the performance of multicast transmissions
over ATM. Current MBone tools provide adequate (although low frame rate) video
transmissions over the Internet, but performance is limited by the available bandwidth.
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Although ATM is a young technology, it's high bandwidth and low latency offers the
promise of near-real-time broadcast quality audio/video transmissions.
Security is not addressed in this thesis. However, educators who are
considering an MBone implementation must examine such issues as hardware access,
system availability, acceptable use of the resources and training to ensure that resources
are properly used, so as not to degrade the performance of the regional and global
MBone.
d. Live MulticastA udio/Video Distribution
Internetworking: Using Global ATM Networksfor Live Multicast
Audio/Video Distribution (Erdogan, 1996) documents implementation of the MBone over
a regional Frame Relay wide-area network (WAN).
The Monterey BayNet regional Frame Relay WAN links various K-12
schools, libraries, research and other educational partners around the Monterey Bay area,
but does not effectively take advantage of multicasting technology for distance learning
projects. This thesis documents an inexpensive MBone implementation for distance
learning over Frame Relay. Despite the recommended requirement for multicast routers
for multicasting in a frame relay network, this work also illustrates the feasibility of
implementing multicast service over Frame Relay without using multicast routers.
This thesis also does not discuss security issues per se, but the same issues
discussed above for (Tamer, 1996) apply to this project. System availability will likely be
the primary concern for any educational implementation of the MBone. Proper configu-
ration and use of the MBone tools will ensure continued availability. An emphasis on
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training is required. Additionally, this work parallels the monitoring work documented in
(Edwards, 1 996) in that automatic scripts accessible via home page are used to monitor
MBone status. Although the software tools used in the scripts typically operate with root
permissions, software analysis shows that public access to these scripts does not represent
a confidentiality vulnerability. See Chapter IV for a general discussion of these issues.
e. Economical Storage and Retrieval ofDigital Audio and Videofor
Distance Learning
Internetworking: Economic Digital Storage and Retrieval ofDigital
Audio and Videofor Distance Learning (Tiddy, 1996) compares and evaluates existing
digital storage methods for audio and video.
While the Internet already provides for transmission of near-real-time
audio and video over the Internet using either unicast or multicast messages, current
audio/video tools for viewing archived files require the entire file be downloaded to the
local workstation before it can be viewed. For most users this is infeasible with large
files. Therefore this thesis compares and documents the efficiency of existing transfer
modes, file formats and data compression methods for on-demand audio and video over
the Internet.
This thesis also does not specifically address security issues. However,
similar to (Edwards, 1996) and (Erdogan, 1996), this project implements scripts that are
accessible via home pages. The scripts receive requests to transfer archived audio/video
files to remote users. Anytime a server receives input from external users (especially path
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information for file manipulation) there is the possibility that it can be subverted (Stein,
1996).
/ Implementing IPv6 in the Marine Corps Tactical Data Network
Internetworking: Technical Strategyfor Implementing the Next
Generation Internet Protocol (IPv6) in the Marine Corps Tactical Data Network (Nierle,
1 996) describes an Internet Protocol (IP) addressing plan for use in the Marine Corps'
Tactical Data Network (TDN). This thesis discusses the current Marine Corps
internetworking requirements but also recognizes the weaknesses associated with the
existing Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and the yet-to-be—demonstrated security
features of the next-generation Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). 5 Nierle presents a
tactical addressing plan for the TDN that works with IPv4 and facilitates smooth
migration to IPv6 as the technology matures.
Security considerations summarized in this thesis include the need for data
security as well as physical security of networking hardware. This thesis also describes
the enhancements of IPv6 over IPv4 concerning native security support at the Internet (IP)
layer and improved mechanisms for controlling the quality of service (QoS).
3. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is an open international community
composed of network designers, researchers, vendors and users. The IETF is the
engineering and protocol development arm of the Internet. The IETF is organized into a
5
IP version 5 was assigned to another protocol which was subsequently unused
(Huitema, 1996).
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number of focus areas, each with its own specific charter. Each focus area is composed
of a number of working groups. The current IETF focus areas and the Security Area
working groups are shown in Table 5. (IETF, 1996)
Chapters V and VII in this thesis describe the Kerberos authentication and
authorization system and its implementation at NPS. Kerberos is a secure network access
mechanism that relies on a trusted host to provide authentication services without sending
passwords over the network in the clear. Work relating to Kerberos and the use of public-
key cryptography for the initial Kerberos authentication is covered by the Common
Authentication Technology (CAT) working group. This group focuses on providing
protocol-independent distributed security services. Their work focuses on security
• Applications Area
• Internet Area
• Network Management Area
• Operational Requirements Area
• Routing Area
• Security Area
o Authenticated Firewall Traversal (aft)
o Common Authentication Technology (cat)
o Domain Name System Security (dnssec)
o IP Security Protocol (ipsec)
o One Time Password Authentication (otp)
o Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix)
o Transport Layer Security (tls)
o Web Transaction Security (wts)
• Transport Area
• User Services Area
Table 5. IETF focus areas and Security Area working
groups (IETF, 1996).
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implementation tasks and interfaces rather than on integrating security data elements into
specific protocols. Mailing list information for the CAT working group follows.
IETF CAT Working Group Mailing List Information:
General discussion: cat-ietf@mit.edu
To subscribe: cat-ietf-request@mit.edu
Archive: ftp://bitsy. mil. edu/cat-ietf/archive/
4. The ATM Forum
The ATM Forum is an international non-profit organization composed of over
700 member companies. The organization's objective is to accelerate the use ofATM
technology through industry cooperation in protocol and standards development, as well
as education of the networking and telecommunication community on the capabilities of
ATM (ATM, 1996). The security working group within the ATM Forum was established
in July 1995 for the purpose of defining ATM security specifications (Rendleman, 1995).
The group is not expected to publish a final version ofATM Security Specification (SS)
1.0 until mid- 1997 (Sheth, 1996). Work completed by the ATM Forum is available for a
fee to non-members. Work in progress typically is not available for review or comment.
Occasionally ATM Forum development efforts are performed openly in cooperation with
IETF working groups.
5. Information Wide-Area Year (I-WAY)
The Information Wide-Area Year (I-WAY) is an experimental high-performance
internetwork linking approximately 30 of the country's fastest computers and advanced
visualization environments on approximately 1 1 different regional ATM networks.6 The
6
Information about the I-WAY is available at http://www.iway.org
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I-WAY supports both TCP/IP over ATM and native ATM-oriented protocols. The
supercomputers linked by the I-WAY provide the resources required to run simulations in
a variety of virtual environments. To control remote access to these resources, the
I-WAY uses the Kerberos authentication and authorization protocol. The Kerberos
implementation at NPS began as a class project to establish connectivity with other
I-WAY participants during the Supercomputing '95 conference held in San Diego
California in December 1995. (Karin, 1995)
6. Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
The existing Internet Protocol has a number of limitations both in its addressing
structure and with security implementation that requires improvements. Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6) is a designed to replace the current Internet Protocol version (IPv4).
(Deering and Hinden, 1995) The new version remains a connectionless protocol but does
define a number of improvements over IPv4. IPv6 expands the IP address size from 32
bits to 128 bits and also improves multicast message routing. IPv6 implements flow
labeling, authentication and privacy capabilities. The flow labeling capability allows for
specific quality of service (QoS) or "real-time" requests. The IPv6 specification also
defines extensions to support authentication, data integrity and (optional) data confidenti-
ality. One active area of work is getting vendors and users to implement these extensions.
(Huitema, 1996; Nierle, 1996; Deering and Hinden, 1995)
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7. Additional Related NPS Research
a* Integrating the Defense Message System and the Global
Broadcast System
Tactical DMS: A Global Broadcast Service Option (Morales, 1 996)
describes a means of integrating the Defense Message System (DMS) and the Global
Broadcast System (GBS). It also pertains to multicasting work being done by the IIRG.
This thesis discusses the security and multicast advantages present in IPv6 and examines
many of the same tactical issues presented in (Nierle, 1996).
b. Trust and Interoperability in a Networked Environment
Ensuring a C2 Level of Trust and Interoperability in a Networked
Windows NT Environment (Lucas, 1996) provides an in-depth discussion of the advan-
tages, disadvantages and applicability of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC) (DoD, 1985) for today's military networks. This project describes the
broad scope of computer security in today's computing environment and emphasizes the
need for "trusted systems" to ensure confidentiality, integrity and system availability.
This thesis presents a case study of a military network using Windows NT version 3.51
and evaluates how effectively this network operating system meets the requirements of
the TCSEC.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter provides the background information necessary for the reader to
understand what computer security is and why computer security is important.
Department of the Navy AIS security considerations are discussed and the (often hazy)
distinction between the terms threat, vulnerability, risk, and control are clarified.
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Network communication and security service functionality concepts within the ISO OSI
reference model are discussed. Network communication and security functionality
associated with the TCP/IP protocol suite and ATM protocols are also briefly discussed.
Some of the vulnerabilities associated with ATM are highlighted. The chapter concludes




There are two primary variables that affect the security of any information system:
technology and people. Technology issues must address what security is, how best to
implement existing capabilities-, and how to integrate emerging technologies while
remaining secure. People issues must address how much security is required, as well as
who, when, why and from where access to the computer system/network will be allowed.
The two perspectives frequently overlap when new technology is applied to support
security. Section B defines the two primary problems this thesis addresses: (1) under-
standing the scope and need for computer system/network security for unclassified
systems and (2) countering the threat of unauthorized system/network access resulting
from open and interoperable networks. Section C briefly describes the solutions pre-
sented in this thesis.
B. PROBLEMS
1. Understanding Networked Computer System Security
Networked computer system security is a complex problem, one that is no longer
solely restricted to military or national security and associated classified computer
systems and networks. In 1996 there were over 250,000 attempted break-ins to unclassi-
fied systems within the Department of Defense (DoD); two-thirds of those were success-
ful (Zuckermann, 1996). Computer/network security now encompasses a much wider
scope than just confidentiality and basic access controls. Accelerating trends in
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networking requires a shift in how managers and users view security. Computer and
network professionals must understand the scope of security and recognize the need for
security for even their unclassified systems.
One tenet of the IIRG is that technical problems have technical solutions, and
people problems have people solutions. Difficulties often arise when problems and
solutions are mismatched. This thesis attempts to be very clear in distinguishing whether
problems and solutions are technology-related or people-related.
AIS security is primarily a management issue in that technical, administrative and
procedural controls implemented to secure information systems cost money. Regardless
of the size of an organization, managers control the money. Managers must set priorities,
make decisions and allocate scarce organizational resources. Therefore managers must
ultimately determine the level of security required for any given system, and managers
must accept responsibility for the consequences if information security proves inadequate.
Of course, managers are foolish if they make decisions without first examining the issues
involved in making those decisions.
The main challenge with securing a networked automated information system is
recognizing that threats to AIS security exist and admitting that the system in question is
not immune to those threats. The specific problem is in articulating the need for AIS
security in the form of a quantitative security policy that is acceptable to all stakeholders.
Managers must then take the necessary implementation steps, allocate the necessary
resources and provide the necessary support to carry out that policy. Proper planning,
analysis and implementation can ensure a sufficiently secure system.
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2. Open Systems
The emphasis on open and interoperable networks has left many systems vulnera-
ble to a wide variety of attacks. In a stand-alone computing environment, threats to AIS
security are relatively easy to control. However, once computers are connected together
to form a single integrated network, which is then connected to other integrated networks
form internetworks, the risks associated with previously existing threats are greatly
increased and new threats are introduced. Additionally, integrating any new technology
into an existing infrastructure can be problematic and introduce previously unforeseen
security threats. (Fraser, 1996; Fitzgerald, 1993; Rich, 1992)
Transmission of static passwords in plain text over the Internet has been one of
the most widely publicized vulnerabilities to network security (CERT, 1994; NIST, 1994;
McNulty, 1994). Mr. F. Lynn McNulty, the Associate Director for Computer Security at
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), has testified before Congress
that "traditional user authentication by means of re-useable passwords does not provide
strong security in today's networked environment ~ with or without encryption"
(McNulty, 1994, pg. 59). The use of one-time passwords (such as the S-Key protocol
(Haller, 1995)) or other secure remote access mechanism (such as the Kerberos protocol
(Miller, et ah, 1987)) has been recommended to protect against unauthorized access to
computer systems connected to the Internet (NIST, 1994; McNulty, 1994; Bennington,
1991).
As a graduate education and research institution, the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) relies heavily on computer networking and internetworking. NPS must maintain
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open connectivity with local and remote research partners if it is to accomplish its
mission. NPS must also take the necessary steps to protect its systems and the informa-
tion stored on those systems from unauthorized access. This is a precarious balance.
Although an open environment promotes collaborative research, it is also an inviting
target. Therefore security is necessary if for no other reason than to maintain connectivity
and to protect research information.
C. EXPERIMENTAL SOLUTIONS
This thesis examines many of the issues that must be addressed when assessing
the need for computer system/network security. The issues discussed are used as a basis
for a site security survey for the unclassified integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN in the
Systems Technology Lab (STL) at NPS. This assessment is merely a starting point;
recommendations for additional steps needed to improve the state of security are in-
cluded.
To improve remote plaintext password protection we implement and examine the
feasibility of the Kerberos authentication protocol. As with the security survey, this is
merely a starting point. There remains much work to be done. Nevertheless the results
presented in this thesis are promising and productive.
D. SUMMARY
There are usually two aspects to any problem: a social aspect and a technological
aspect. This chapter explains the problem of computer system/network security from
these two perspectives. Computer system/network security is first a social issue in that it
affects people. Managers and users alike often do not understand networked computer
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system security or the need for it, yet managers are responsible for ensuring security is
adequate yet not restrictive. Computer system/network security is also a technological
issue for two reasons: technology often exacerbates the social issues, and management
policy concerning system/network security is often enforced through the use of technol-
ogy. Section B briefly describes the two primary problems associated with system/
network security from these two perspectives and Section C lists the solutions presented
in this thesis to address these problems.
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IV. INTEGRATED IP/ATM LAN/WAN SECURITY ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
Automated information system (AIS) security is primarily a management chal-
lenge (Walker, 1991). This chapter discusses some of the issues managers face when
deciding how to enhance the security of their computer system/network. Security
controls are not discussed in detail here since they are examined extensively in a number
of other sources (Cobb, 1992; DoN, 1991; Wong and Watt, 1990; Palmer and Potter,
1989; Wood et al, 1989). While the decision outcomes concerning security vary from
system to system, the issues are largely technology-independent and must be addressed
for each system. Section B discusses the administration issues of AIS security policies,
plans and procedures. Environmental issues relating to natural and human events are
discussed in Section C. Software and data security issues are discussed in Section D.
Security issues associated with telecommunications and system access are discussed in
Section E. Finally, issues concerning security implementation are discussed in Section F.
The issues highlighted in this chapter are used as a basis to assess the status of
security associated with the integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS. The results of that
assessment are presented in Chapter VI.
B. ADMINISTRATION ISSUES
How much security is required? What types of controls are required? These
questions are not trivial and must be answered before scarce resources are allocated to
implement any security controls. Before these questions can be answered, system
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administration managers must identify the purpose and acceptable uses of the information
system in question, and they must identify the individuals who will be responsible for
implementing and administering system security. Furthermore, managers need to
understand the environment in which they are operating and the threats such an environ-
ment presents. Management decisions must then be documented and disseminated to as
wide an audience as possible. Users, system administrators and other managers alike
must be made aware of these decisions. This section discusses the need for managers to
address such issues prior to implementing security controls. Subsection 1 discusses
system availability requirements, Subsection 2 discusses system security and acceptable
use policies (AUPs) and Subsection 3 discusses contingency planning.
1. System Availability Requirements
Protecting against denial of system service is one of the basic goals of computer
system/network security. (See the definition of AIS security in Chapter II.) It also is
probably the most difficult goal to achieve. Like many other aspects of system/network
security, protecting system services is itself a multifaceted problem. Nevertheless system
availability must be addressed because an information system is useless if users cannot
get or use the system resources they need.
One of the primary issues that will determine the amount of security required for
an information system is the importance of the system and the information it processes.
System availability requirements (i.e. maximum allowable down time) will vary accord-
ing to this assessment and must be clearly understood. A critical system may have a 99%
(or greater) availability requirement (e.g. down time not to exceed 15 minutes in a 24
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hour period), whereas a secondary or noncritical system may be able to accommodate
much longer down times. (Buddenberg. 1995; Russell and Gangemi, 1991; Wong and
Watt, 1990)
Of related interest is the ongoing lack of any system availability requirement for
NPS, recently demonstrated by a 3-week "security shutdown" of all networked computing
systems in late 1995. This occurred despite the fact that one of the major goals of the
NPS Automated Data Processing Security Program (NPS, 1992) is to "minimize the
denial ofADP services to authorized users which might occur as a result of unauthorized
access, operator error, power disruption, malicious acts, etc." (NPS, 1992, pg. 2).
Repercussions of such shutdowns jeopardize the operations, mission and long-term
viability of the school.
Threats to system availability are not limited strictly to the environmental,
telecommunications or system-access threats discussed later in this chapter. Restricted
computing center operating hours, inadequate help facilities (human or automated), and
even inadequate memory, disk space or other resources can also lead to denial of service.
While a complete discussion ofhow to determine system availability requirements is
beyond the scope of this work, managers must carefully consider such requirements
before any security controls are implemented. Without a careful analysis of system
availability requirements, managers are unable to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the
various controls. (Buddenberg, 1995; Russell and Gangemi, 1991; Wong and Watt,
1990)
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2. System Security and Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs)
Before managers can determine how much and what type of security controls to
implement for any given AIS, they must determine their goals and priorities concerning
security for the organization and that system. This determination constitutes an organiza-
tion's AIS security policy which clearly outlines "the set of rules, principles and proce-
dures that regulate how an organization manages, protects, and controls . . . computer
resources and the information they contain" (Cobb, 1992, pg. 111). The system security
policy needs to clearly describe organizational priorities and philosophy concerning AIS
security. This policy must be explained through training and distributed freely throughout
the organization. (Fraser, 1996; Cobb, 1992; Russell and Gangemi, 1991; Wong and
Watt, 1990)
A security philosophy will fall somewhere on the continuum between "denying
all" system/network access and services and "allowing all" system/network access and
services (Fraser, 1996; Russell and Gangemi, 1991). This is the fundamental dichotomy
in the protection against denial of system services. A "deny all" policy will almost
certainly eliminate unauthorized access but will also undoubtedly deny use of required
services to otherwise legitimate users. Conversely an "allow all" policy will give users
access to all required services but will also make those same services vulnerable to a
denial-of-service attack. Therefore, policy decisions will reflect trade-offs: trade-offs
between the available computing services offered and the amount of security provided;
trade-offs between the ease of system use and the sophistication of security controls; and
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trade-offs between the AIS security costs (both tangible and intangible) and the risk of
loss if a security incident occurs (Fraser, 1996).
The organization's acceptable use policy (AUP) for information resources is
closely related to system availability and may be an integral part of the system security
policy (Fraser, 1996). Automated information systems represent a large investment for
most organizations and are usually employed in a multi-user environment. In such an
environment, there is always the temptation for individual users to abuse or otherwise use
the system resources either unproductively or inefficiently. If resources are being used
for nonproductive or illegitimate purposes, they are unavailable for other users with
legitimate and productive computing to accomplish. Borrowing a concept from economic
theory, if users are not held personally responsible for their use of the resources, it is
conceivable that the system might suffer a "tragedy of the commons." Such a situation
occurs when communal resources are depleted through overuse or abuse by individuals
who do not have a personal stake in the resource (Heyne, 1994). From a security stand-
point, unauthorized use of information systems may present additional or unanticipated
security threats to the system. Therefore managers must establish explicit acceptable use
policies (AUPs). These administrative policies seek to ensure that the computing
resources are used effectively and efficiently. Although NPS does have a campus-wide
AUP (NPS, 1995), it shares the same problems of effectiveness and enforceability
associated with any administrative policy. Users are not explicitly instructed or briefed




No matter how much money an organization spends on IS security or how many
controls are in place, disasters and security incidents can still occur. The actions an
organization will take following such an occurrence must be planned and documented
well in advance; it does little good (indeed it harms legitimate users) to lock one's front
door after the thief has come and gone. These contingency plans must contain specific
actions an organization will take, not only to react to a security incident or disaster but to
recover from it as well. (Fraser, 1996; Fitzgerald, 1993; Cobb, 1992) The recovery
actions outlined in the contingency plans will depend largely on the system availability
requirements discussed above, therefore it is imperative that managers identify those
requirements first (Palmer and Potter, 1989). NPS directives mandate that a contingency
plan "be developed for each AIS where a disruption of service would have a critical
impact on mission accomplishment" (NPS, 1992). Such a plan dos not exist and is not in
wide use at NPS (Franklin, 1996; Norman, 1996).
Contingency planning is closely coupled with risk analysis and should include
procedures for recovering from all threats to system security, not simply those presented
by the environment. While it is important to have procedures in place in the event of a
fire, flood, or power outage, it is equally important to plan for unanticipated hardware or
software failures (such as a hard disk crash or software bug) and for malicious acts (such
as a network virus or unauthorized network access). The more familiar personnel are
with the contingency procedures, the faster the response is likely to be, quite possibly
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reducing the impact of the incident. (Fraser, 1996; Cobb, 1992; Wong and Watt, 1990;
Palmer and Potter, 1989)
4. Roles and Responsibilities
AIS security roles and responsibilities for all personnel — managers, administra-
tors, technicians and users— must be clearly documented and the affected personnel
must be aware of (and intimately familiar with) the detailed requirements for their respec-
tive roles and responsibilities. AIS security responsibilities are often assigned to system
administrators in addition to other roles and responsibilities. While this is not in itself
unsatisfactory, managers must ensure that appropriate priority is given to the security
responsibilities. As seen in Table 6, AIS security is a complex field with a great many
roles and responsibilities that must be accomplished. Although some of these responsibil-
ities will not apply to all organizations, it is easy to understand why, even in a small
organization, AIS security requirements may quickly overwhelm even the most efficient
system administrator. This is especially since most system administrators are already
heavily tasked. If AIS security truly is a priority, managers must ensure adequate
resources are allocated to satisfy that priority. (Fitzgerald, 1993; Cobb, 1992; Wong and
Watt, 1991) NPS AIS "corporate" security roles and responsibilities are outlined in
(NPS, 1992). Additional roles and responsibilities may be assigned on an individual
departmental basis.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Effective and efficient security controls cannot be implemented without a clear
understanding of the physical environment in which an AIS is operating. Automated
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corporate IT security policy
security of data center, communication network and terminals
liaison with computer users
production and enforcement of security standards and procedures
Data Protection Act compliance
risk analysis and monitoring
implementation and administration of access control equipment and software
control of encryption and authentication devices
contingency planning and computer insurance
Table 6. IS security roles. From (Wong and Watt, 1991, pp. 128-129).
information systems are susceptible to a great many environmental hazards broadly
classified as either a product of nature (e.g. earthquakes or floods) or a product of humans
(e.g. intentional or accidental damage or destruction of equipment). Some environmental
threats (unstable electrical power and fire, for example) can be caused either by nature or
by man, but in such cases it usually does not matter how such disasters are caused since
the end results are identical. Therefore the controls to counter these threats are likely to
be identical. Natural threats are briefly discussed in Subsection 1 and human-induced
threats are discussed in Subsection 2.
1. Natural Disasters
While often improbable, natural disasters are still quite possible. Threats in this
category include not only familiar threats such as fires, floods, unstable electrical power
and static electricity shocks, but also such uncommon threats as earthquakes, tsunamis
and acts of war. Of course each site will have its own unique collection of threats.
Controls in this category include but are not limited to: sprinkler systems, surge protec-
tors or uninterruptible power supplies, anti-static carpeting, placing hardware on raised
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platforms, plastic sheets or covers to protect hardware from falling water, and tempera-
ture/humidity monitors to warn against excessive heat or humidity. (Palmer and Potter,
1989; Wood et al, 1987) Minimum measures for protection against environmental
threats are outlined in Appendix B of (NPS, 1992).
2. Human Disasters
Human disasters can be either accidental or intentional. Controls for intentional
human threats typically focus on physical access security to protect against outside
intruders. Hardware is locked up or access is otherwise controlled using a number of
different mechanisms, ranging from simple escort procedures, access control lists and
identification badges to more sophisticated equipment such as magnetic strip smart cards
or biometric identification devices (e.g. finger print readers or retinal scanners). How-
ever, most human induced disasters are caused by internal personnel; authorized system
users are far more likely to cause damage to the system than any external threat
(Baskerville, 1989).
While disgruntled employees are a legitimate threat to system security, most
damage caused by insiders is unintentional. The disgruntled employee threat can be
minimized by good personnel security and proactive leadership. Accidental damage can
be minimized through adequate administrative policies, consistent enforcement of those
policies and adequate training. Additionally, software can provide simple automatic
monitoring capabilities with system status results available via home page and electronic
mail (Edwards, 1996; Erdogan 1996).
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D. SOFTWARE AND DATA ISSUES
As costly as computer hardware may be, the most valuable asset associated with a
computer system/network is usually the data and information it processes. This section
discusses software and data security issues. Configuration management issues are
discussed in Subsection 1 ; integrity and confidentiality issues are discussed in Subsection
2; the need for system backups is in Subsection 3.
1. Configuration Management
Configuration management is the process of "identifying, controlling, accounting
for, and auditing all changes made to the baseline TCB [trusted computing base],
including hardware, firmware, and software . . ." (Russell and Gangemi, 1991, pg. 145).
As implied in the definition above, the term "configuration management" is often
reserved for use with trusted systems (e.g. systems that process classified information),
yet it is equally applicable to those systems processing and storing only unclassified or
nonsensitive data. Improper system configuration or imperfect integration of application
software can weaken system security. New application software releases can introduce
additional security holes (CERT, 1996a; CERT, 1996b). Removing old or unneeded
software not only simplifies file management but also avoids possible configuration
conflicts with new software. Outdated operating system software with known security
holes also must be updated with the latest software patch and old versions deleted from
the system. System administrators must remain informed and take the necessary steps to
minimize newly discovered threats and vulnerabilities of system and application software.
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(Fraser, 1996; Curry, 1990; Rich, 1992) General configuration management require-
ments for NPS are outlined in (NPS, 1992).
2. Integrity and Confidentiality
Integrity and confidentiality of stored data can be protected using cryptographic
checksums and bulk file encryption, but the primary means for protecting data integrity
and confidentiality while it is stored and processed on an AIS is through data access
controls. (Data integrity and confidentiality during transmission over network connec-
tions is discussed in Section E.) While physical access controls indirectly protect against
data modification, destruction and disclosure by disallowing unauthorized access to the
hardware components, data access controls directly protect against data modification,
destruction and disclosure by disallowing unauthorized access to the software and data
files.
Sensitivity of the data will determine whether discretionary access controls (DAC)
or mandatory access controls (MAC) are required. DAC allow users to set access
permissions on their own files as they wish (e.g. the standard Unix file permissions).
MAC are set and enforced by the AIS operating system security kernel based on security
labels assigned to system objects (e.g. files, directories, processes and users) in accor-
dance with the organization's security policy. In the latter case, users do not have
complete control over how the permissions are set. MAC is used typically in multilevel
security environments. (Russell and Gangemi, 1991; DoD, 1985) The NPS ADP
Security Program directive (NPS, 1992) does not address general data confidentiality and
integrity policies for unclassified computing systems.
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3. System Backups
System hardware is usually replaced rather easily, although often at considerable
one-time cost. The same cannot always be said about the data that is stored on a system;
data is often priceless or is not reproducible. Data and software are vulnerable to a
variety of threats that include viruses or other malicious software, disgruntled or un-
trained employees, and hardware failure (e.g. a hard disk crash). The easiest control
against unintentional or malicious modification or destruction of data is to conduct
adequate system backups. System backups must also be stored securely to ensure they
themselves are not damaged or otherwise corrupted in the event of an incident. Backups
must be a true representation of the system state before the incident. (Fraser, 1996; NPS,
1992; Russell and Gangemi, 1991; Wong and Watt, 1990)
Again, the importance of the data stored on the system will determine the
frequency of the backups. The organization will want to backup critical data much more
often than noncritical data, but even noncritical data needs to be backed up periodically.
Although it is wise for users in a multi-user environment to maintain personal backup
copies of their files, this is often infeasible due to classification or large file sizes.
Therefore it is appropriate for users to expect the computing services staff to conduct
regular file system backups that include even noncritical user data. The organization's
backup policy must consider user expectations and must also be documented and widely
distributed within the organization. NPS backup policy is documented in (NPS, 1992)
and explicitly states that users are responsible for their own data files. Individual system
backup requirements vary depending on the classification of information that is processed
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or stored on each individual system (NPS, 1992). While there is some disagreement
between the users and administrators concerning the adequacy of the NPS backup
policies, the policies are widely followed.
E. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SYSTEM ACCESS ISSUES
Managers must consider telecommunications and system access issues when
determining system security requirements. Subsection 1 discusses network access
controls. Subsection 2 discusses the concepts of identification, authentication and
authorization. Subsection 3 discusses the notion of nonrepudiation. Subsection 4
discusses data confidentiality and integrity with regards to network communications.
Subsection 5 discusses issues relating to network connectivity.
1. Access Control
Network access security is arguably the most important and most challenging
facet of AIS security given today's computing environment. Every unprotected network
port is an open door into the system. As with system availability requirements, network
access security is multifaceted. It concerns not only physical access to system compo-
nents (i.e. the network infrastructure) and access to data and software as discussed above,
but also telecommunications access. Intruders may gain access to a network through
telecommunications networks to manipulate the data or software. NPS access control
policy is to grant access to only those systems and data an individual needs to accomplish
assigned tasks. This policy is specified in (NPS, 1 992). The general policy is widely
followed but specific procedures for implementing the policy are left to the discretion of
individual network managers.
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The first line of defense for network access security is controlling physical access
to system hardware components (i.e. the network infrastructure) including workstations,
network cabling, disk drives, communication routers and network switches. Although
controlling access to private network components through routine physical security
mechanisms is relatively straightforward, controlling access to the public infrastructure is
not possible. Public routers and switches can be subverted; an intruder can eavesdrop on
network traffic by tapping cables and wires or by gaining access to network switches and
routers and reconfiguring the routing tables to misroute data packets. Public networks are
outside the realm of responsibility of the organization and must not be trusted. (Kluepfel,
1996)
A physically secure network does not guarantee network security. Modern
computer networks are typically protected from unauthorized telecommunications access
by a filtering-router firewall. Filtering-router firewalls examine the source IP address of
incoming data packets and filter out those packets with IP addresses that are not autho-
rized access to the network. Unfortunately the source IP address of incoming data
packets can be altered by an intruder to fool a firewall into allowing otherwise unautho-
rized packets access to the network. This type of attack is called "address-spoofing." A
number of spoofing methods are documented in (Bellovin, 1 989). Once the firewall has
been breached the network applications that use source IP addresses for authentication are
vulnerable to the same form of attack. (CERT, 1995; Bellovin, 1989)
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The "cracker" (or "hacker")7 threat has been widely publicized in recent years. In
1996, unclassified DoD computer systems were attacked an estimated 250,000 times with
nearly two-thirds of those attacks being successful (Zuckermann, 1996). "Cracker"
attacks include attacks on the network infrastructure as well as attacks against the
software and data. These attacks include password-sniffing attacks, address- spoofing
attacks and denial of service attacks. Most successful attacks exploit well-known, well-
documented system vulnerabilities. Therefore it is imperative that system administrators
remain informed about and attempt to remedy system vulnerabilities. Of course it is
important to note that system administration personnel must expend valuable time and
resources to remain current. Like most security issues, there is a tradeoff. (Kluepfel,
1996; Haller, 1994; Rich, 1992)
2. Identification, Authentication and Authorization
The next line of defense in network access security is identification, authenti-
cation and authorization. Identification verifies the existence of a particular user.
Authentication verifies the user is actually who they claim to be. Authorization verifies
the user is allowed access to particular system services. These three network security
functions form the foundation of all AIS security; an intruder cannot gain access to an
AIS unless they subvert all three functions. Controlling access to the public network
7 The terms "hacker" and "cracker" are somewhat ambiguous and greatly debated.
(Russell and Gangemi, 1991) defines a "hacker" as an individual with a keen interest in computer
systems and an eagerness to experiment with them and test their limits. They define a "cracker"
as an individual who intentionally breaks into computer systems with malicious intent.
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infrastructure is the ideal first step in network access security that is not feasible.
Therefore identification, authentication and authorization become the first line.
The first objective of most attacks on a system is to gain access to the data. To
successfully gain access an attacker need only determine the user ID and password for a
single user on the system. Unfortunately users are notorious for choosing poor passwords
or are careless in protecting them. Conversely, "good" passwords are difficult to
remember which introduces additional insecurities when users write down their pass-
words or are unable to access the system when they forget their passwords. Common
techniques for obtaining passwords include "social engineering" (e.g. impersonating a
system administrator over the telephone) (Winkler, 1995), exploiting operating system
vulnerabilities to gain access to the system password file, installing a Trojan Horse8 on a
networked workstation to transmit login sequences to the intruder, and capturing unen-
crypted remote login sequences by "sniffing" data packets while eavesdropping on remote
network connections. One of the most significant dangers associated with static multi-
use passwords is that it usually is not possible to detect or know when a particular
password has been compromised.
In general, using static passwords has been greatly criticized by law enforcement,
academic and government experts. These experts recommend implementing a dynamic
password scheme such as Bellcore's S-Key protocol (Haller, 1995) or other secure access
8 A Trojan Horse is a computer program or code fragment that "hides in an independent
program that performs a useful or appealing function— or appears to perform that function.
Along with the apparent function, however, the program also performs some other unauthorized
operation" (Russell and Gangemi, 1991, pg. 83).
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mechanism such as MIT's Kerberos protocol (Miller et al., 1985). Implementing a
second authentication mechanism such as a magnetic smart card or a biometric device
such as a fingerprint reader will greatly increase system and network access security.
(McNulty, 1994; NIST, 1994; Bennington, 1991)
3. Nonrepudiation
Nonrepudiation is the process of protecting against denial of receipt or transmis-
sion of data by the receiver or sender respectively. As the commercial use of the Internet
continues to expand, nonrepudiation will become increasingly important. Electronic
commerce will require nonrepudiation mechanisms to protect the interests of both
suppliers and consumers. This will require some form of cryptography. Many current
nonrepudiation mechanisms are based on the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) (NIST,
1992). There are many issues and concerns that still must be resolved before nonrepudi-
ation mechanisms are widely implemented. The greatest of these include whether to use
secret-key cryptography or public-key cryptography, how to distribute and manage the
cryptographic keys, what control an organization will exercise over its employees' keys,
what role government will play in the process and what impact cryptographic software
export restrictions will have on the organization. These issues will need to be addressed
in the organization's information security policy. (Carpenter and Baker, 1996; Fahn,
1993) Nonrepudiation policies are currently uncommon due to lack of consensus on
technical, administrative and economic issues.
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4. Integrity, Confidentiality and Authenticity
Because securing the network "pipe" is infeasible in today's interconnected
networking environment, we must secure the data in the "pipe" if data security is
required. Confidentiality during network transmission can be sufficiently assured by
using a bulk encryption protocol such as DES (NIST, 1988) or RSA (Rivest et al, 1978).
If encryption is done below the network layer, intermediate nodes within the network
must be able to decrypt the data packet to find where it next needs to be routed. This
slows delivery and also provides the opportunity for an intruder with access to an
intermediate node to view the packet contents. Encrypting the data packets at the
application layer guards against this possibility, but also opens the door for intruders to
analyze traffic flow between nodes (i.e. packet frequency, size, addressees etc.) with the
hope of piecing together useful information. Just as with most decisions concerning AIS
security, there are many tradeoffs.
Data integrity during network transmissions can be sufficiently assured using
cryptographic checksums or message digests such as MD5 (Rivest, 1 992) or the secure
hash algorithm (SHA) portion of the DSS (NIST, 1992). Similarly, data authenticity can
be sufficiently assured using digital signatures such as those provided by the DSS or PGP
(Zimmerman, 1994).
5. Network Connectivity
Besides the physical security of network cabling and hardware, there are three
connectivity variables in which we are interested. The first variable is the type of hosts to
which we are connecting. The security challenges present when connecting similar hosts
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(e.g. ATM-to-ATM or IP-to-IP) may be different than when connecting dissimilar hosts
(e.g. ATM-to-IP). The second variable is the connection method. The security chal-
lenges when remotely connecting to a network over the Internet may be different than
when remotely connecting to a network using direct-dial telephone lines. The third
variable is the message address. Messages with multicast addresses may be vulnerable to
different security challenges than messages with unicast addresses. We examine these
network connectivity issues in detail.
a. Similar versus Dissimilar Hosts
Much current work focuses on running IP and other higher-layer protocols
over ATM in addition to native ATM-to-ATM connections. This hybrid approach
theoretically permits the use of TCP/IP firewalls to protect a network. However, native
cell-based ATM environments cannot use IP packet filters because protocol differences
are too great (Rendleman, 1995). Nevertheless research is being performed in the area of
ATM firewalls (Chuang, 1995; Raynovich, 1995). One approach recommends filtering
only the call setup cells (Chuang, 1995). Another proposed solution combines hardware
and software and promises to filter each cell without slowing down the data rate
(Raynovich, 1995). In either case, for hosts connected to both an internal Ethernet LAN
and an external ATM WAN, there is little assurance (other than protocol complexity, a
dubious safeguard) that an intruder will not come through an ATM port, exploit a system
vulnerability and then gain access to the internal IP network (Rendleman, 1995).
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b. Internet versus Direct-dial Telephone Lines
The Internet is an open environment and various insecurities have been
discussed throughout this work. As mentioned above, most Internet attacks attempt to
exploit well-known, well-documented system vulnerabilities. While patches are available
for most of these vulnerabilities, it is essentially impossible that all nodes have the latest
patch; there will always be a hole somewhere in the net. It is unwise for organizations to
trust or expect Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide security for data transmitted
over the Internet regardless of what the underlying network infrastructure looks like.
Since the Internet is not an inherently secure environment, it is similarly unlikely that a
public ATM network will be a particularly secure environment.
Direct-dial telephone lines are safer but are still vulnerable. Communica-
tion networks are weakly protected and particularly susceptible to human interference.
The following quote from an IETF draft copy of National Information Infrastructure Risk
Assessment: A Nation at Risk as quoted in (Bollentin, 1996) demonstrates the vulnerabil-
ity quite well.
Within the PSN [public switched network], intruders have already com-
promised nearly all categories of activities, from switching systems to
operations, administration, maintenance, and provisioning (OAM&P)
systems, and to packet data networks. Private branch exchanges and
corporate networks that tie into the public network have crashed or dis-
rupted signal transfer points (STPs), traffic switches, OAM&P systems,
and other network elements. They have planted destructive 'time bomb'
programs designed to shut down switching hubs, disrupted E-91 1 services
throughout the eastern seaboard, and boasted that they have the capability
to bring down all switches in Manhattan. [Bollentin, 1996, pg. 20]
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c. Unicast versus Multicast Message Addresses
Most Internet communications rely almost exclusively on unicast (i.e.
point-to-point) messages. Messages from one host typically are addressed and sent to
only one other host. Even multi-address electronic mail messages are transmitted as
unicast IP datagrams since the e-mail message is replicated at the mail server and a copy
is sent to each addressee. Internet security (and hence that of unicast messages) have
been discussed throughout this thesis and is documented in a variety of sources (Fraser,
1996; Klaus, 1995; Ranum, 1995; Curry, 1990).
Despite its predominantly unicast nature, the Internet also supports
multicast (i.e. multipoint-to-multipoint) messages using the Internet Multicast Backbone
(MBone). The MBone is a part of the Internet and therefore exhibits the same vulnerabil-
ities. As with the unicast Internet, security is provided primarily by individual MBone
applications. Most of these applications pose little threat to end systems as they cannot
be "coaxed" into writing to disk by incoming packets nor do they run set-uid? However,
MBone management tools such as mtrace or mrinfo do run set-uid and other MBone
management tools such as map-mbone require root privileges. (Kumar, 1996; Savetz, et
al, 1996) Giving public access to these tools, either directly or via a script imbedded in a
home page, introduces a possible system vulnerability. The likelihood an automated
script can be used to invoke these tools fast enough to disrupt network service or that
9
set-uid is a flag used in remote procedure calls that when set for the called procedure,
changes the calling process' uid to that of the called procedure. If the called procedure is running
as root, then the calling process will also run as root with all the associated privileges until the
called procedure returns (Curry, 1990).
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these applications can be subverted by an intruder to gain access to system files is
uncertain but the vulnerability exists nonetheless. A recent software analysis of these
monitoring applications indicates that they are adequately secure for open use (Erdogan,
1996).
The MBone is also theoretically vulnerable to Trojan Horses disguised as
MBone applications. For example, someone might advertise that a new interactive
whiteboard (wb) application which fixes bugs in previous versions is available for
download from the Internet. This seems to be a useful application and one in which
people might be interested. Imagine the frustration if embedded within this appealing
application was the command rm
-rf. When such a new interactive "whiteboard applica-
tion" is executed all files below the current directory will be quietly erased. Currently the
Trojan Horse threat is of little concern as there are relatively few MBone applications.
These applications are written by a relatively small number of individuals who are trusted
and closely monitored within the MBone community. This is an example of consensual
administrative policies providing group security. But as MBone use increases and the
multicasting influence expands, the variety and number of MBone applications is likely to
increase thus increasing the threat.
The MBone is also vulnerable to threats relating to security firewall
configurations. The first vulnerability is the susceptibility to multicast address spoofing.
Multicast messages are sent over the regular Internet but require special routers to handle
the multicast addresses. As multicast routers are not widespread, multicast packets are
encapsulated within standard unicast packets. Tunnels are established between multicast
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routers through the mesh of regular unicast routers. The vulnerability exits not so much
in the MBone itself, as in network security firewalls. Most security firewalls examine
host IP addresses (in this case the mrouter addresses at the tunnel endpoints) accepting
packets from authorized hosts and rejecting packets from unauthorized hosts. However,
packets traversing the multicast tunnel are not authenticated, and therefore any IP host
can send malicious packets through the firewall by posing as the remote tunnel endpoint.
(Kumar, 1996)
Directly related to the previous vulnerability is the fact that current MBone
applications use only the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) at the transport layer, but
multicast addresses are at the IP layer. Because most firewalls filter on the host IP
address (e.g. the IP address of the mrouter serving as the remote tunnel endpoint), all
UDP packets on subscribed multicast channel/port combinations are received by the
operating system kernel regardless of the UDP packet contents. Users may think they are
receiving audio packets when in actuality they are receiving a malicious network file
system packet. To protect against such an attack, filtering routers must inspect the UDP
payload of incoming IP packets for any unwanted UDP ports or protocols. Trusted
software must also behave robustly in the presence of unexpected inputs. (Savetz et al,
1996)
As with all network security decisions, security for the MBone is a
tradeoff. MBone applications can be reasonably trusted at present because most applica-
tions are written by "trusted" individuals. This may change as multicasting becomes
more widespread. Multicast packets can also be filtered by firewalls for added security.
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However, a balance is required between the two filtering extremes. Filtering granularity
that is too fine will degrade performance and may unnecessarily restrict access to MBone
services. Filtering granularity that is too coarse may leave the internal LAN vulnerable
to attack. To date, malevolent security incidents on the MBone have been rare or
nonexistent.
Other threats associated with the MBone also have been identified, most
affecting system availability or the quality of service (QoS). For example, one user
leaving a microphone on or transmitting high-bandwidth video can temporarily degrade
network services for every other user (Macedonia and Brutzman, 1994). Setting the
time-to-live variable too high may also flood the MBone and make it unusable. As with
any other secure channel, trusted distribution of cryptographic keys for "private" MBone
sessions also remains a separate issue. In general, administrative policies (such as
Internet Service Providers detecting/isolating offenders and community cooperation) have
been remarkably effective in minimizing system availability and QoS problems. Lessons
learned are typically automated and incorporated into global software distributions.
F. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
1. Effectiveness and Efficiency
Because AIS security competes for scarce organizational resources (i.e. labor
hours and capital), the resources that are allocated to AIS security must be justified.
Controls must be both effective and efficient. A control that does not adequately protect
against the threat for which it was implemented is not effective. A control that protects
against the threat but is too costly to implement, operate or maintain (compared to the
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value of the hardware, software and data it is protecting) is inefficient. Managers must
carefully consider the cost/benefit relationship between AIS security controls and the
value of the information and equipment the controls are protecting given the existing
environment. NPS policies regarding effectiveness and efficiency are currently decided
on a LAN by LAN (typically department by department) basis.
2. Life-Cycle Costs
To adequately justify security controls, management must understand the costs
associated with AIS security. AIS security increases the cost of an information system
over the entire lifespan of the system. Costs are incurred to implement controls. Costs
are incurred to operate, maintain, support, monitor and enforce the security policy and the
controls that are implemented. All controls interfere with productivity in one fashion or
another and thereby also increase system costs— hence the less obtrusive the controls,
the lower the cost incurred. Finally, AIS security controls reduce a system's life span by
increasing a system's complexity and reducing its flexibility— the more complex and
less flexible a system, the sooner the system will need to be replaced. This requires the
organization to expend resources sooner than it otherwise might. (Baskerville, 1988)
NPS life-cycle planning is performed on a component by component basis. NPS
life-cycle planning requirements are briefly described in (NPS, 1992).
3. Convenience and Acceptance
Managers do not exist in a vacuum; other stakeholders— administrators, techni-
cians and users— are affected by their decisions. This often complicates the AIS
security problem due to occasional lack of consensus among the various system
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stakeholders on just how vulnerable the system is and what needs to be done about it. It
does not much matter what security controls are implemented if such controls unduly
inconvenience personnel. Security controls that are excessively complex or restrictive
will soon be circumvented by IS personnel and users thereby rendering such controls
useless (Fitzgerald, 1993). Extended system shutdowns for security repairs (as in the
December 1995 NPS incident) jeopardizes daily operations, mission completion and
long-term sustainability.
Ideally, security controls are designed into a system from its inception, taking user
and mission needs into account. This practice tends to reduce the productivity costs
associated with AIS security by making control and audit mechanisms transparent to
system users and reducing user resistance to such mechanisms. However, security
requirements are often overlooked during the requirements-analysis phase of system
design. (Fraser, 1996; NCSC, 1993; Baskerville, 1989; Palmer and Potter, 1989)
Similarly, if IS administrators, technicians and users do not understand the need for
system security, any control that is implemented will likely be circumvented. It is
therefore paramount that IS personnel be made aware of IS security needs and priorities
through training and continued communication between and among managers,
administrators, and users. (Fitzgerald, 1993; Wong and Watt, 1990)
G. SUMMARY
Securing a networked computer system is a complex problem. If a networked
computer system is to be secure, managers must understand the need for system security
and decide how much and what type of security controls are required. Their decisions
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and priorities must be well documented and widely distributed in the form of an organiza-
tional security policy. The security policy must clearly state the rules and goals that the
system security controls will enforce. Managers need to ensure adequate resources are
allocated to effectively implement, monitor and enforce the security policy.
Managers need to understand the environment in which their organization's
computer system/network is operating and the threats which the environment presents.
By understanding the enemy, so to speak, managers can develop and implement controls,
plans and procedures to either prevent a security incident from occurring or to effectively
deal with it if one actually occurs. By being proactive rather than reactive, the organiza-
tion may be able to recover from an incident much more quickly and at far less cost than
it otherwise might.
The foundation of networked computer system security is in controlling both
physical and telecommunications access to the system. Telecommunication access
control is accomplished through identification, authentication and authorization mecha-
nisms supported by cryptographic software. Access control becomes more complex when
access is allowed over both the Internet and direct-dial telephone lines. Nonrepudiation,
data integrity and data confidentiality are becoming more important as organizations
begin to use networking and the Internet for commercial gain. Nonrepudiation, data
confidentiality and data integrity also can be accomplished with digital signatures and
cryptographic algorithms. Finally, while not necessarily unique, multicasting does
include certain vulnerabilities that have been successfully prevented to date through
trusted software and effective administrative policies.
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Security controls must be carefully selected based on their effectiveness, ease of
use and efficiency. Complex controls that prove too restrictive or difficult to use will
simply be circumvented by exasperated users and administrators. Of course, all system
users must be made aware of and understand the need for AIS security. Increased
awareness and understanding can be achieved through training and frequent communica-
tion between and among managers, AIS personnel and users. Time and resources spent
on training can pay dividends by increasing the likelihood that security controls are
understood and followed.
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V. SOFTWARE INSTALLATION: KERBEROS
A. INTRODUCTION
Section B in this chapter explains the motivation for implementing the Kerberos
authentication and authorization protocol. Section C presents a general discussion of the
Kerberos protocol and how it works. A detailed analysis is not presented here as more in-
depth discussions of the protocol can be found in (Kohl et al, 1992), (Steiner et al, 1988)
and (Miller et al, 1987). Section D discusses some of the planning issues that must be
considered before any meaningful implementation of Kerberos is undertaken.
B. MOTIVATION: PASSWORD-SNIFFING PROTECTION
One of the most common attacks against network security is a packet-sniffing or
eavesdropping attack during remote sessions. With standard Unix remote access
applications (e.g. rlogin, rsh, rep, ftp, telnet etc.), passwords are transmitted from the
remote system to the host system over the network in the clear (i.e. unencrypted). An
eavesdropper at any intermediate node between the remote system and the host can easily
capture the login sequence (of user ID and password). The captured sequence can then be
used for future unauthorized access to the host system— a particularly undesirable
consequence of remote computing. This type of attack has been rather successful in the
past. For example, in February 1 994, the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
at the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University issued an
advisory for all Internet users to change their passwords in the wake of numerous
successful packet-sniffing attacks (CERT, 1994).
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Academic users often need to travel to conferences and maintain Internet connec-
tivity to securely collaborate over the Internet with colleagues at remote locations. Thus
password security is an important requirement. One solution to the problem of transmit-
ting passwords over an insecure network is the Kerberos authentication and authorization
protocol.
C. THE KERBEROS PROTOCOL
This section briefly explains the Kerberos protocol. Subsection 1 provides a short
description of Kerberos and provides some background information with regard to the
protocol's history and development. Subsection 2 provides a general overview ofhow
the authentication protocol works.
1. Background
Kerberos is a client/server-based access security protocol that relies on a trusted
host known as the "Kerberos authentication server," the "Kerberos key distribution center
(KDC)," or simply "Kerberos." Kerberos provides authentication services for network
principals that are acceptable to both the client and the server. A network principal is any
user (or a client process acting on behalf of a user) or service on a network. The trusted
host (i.e. "Kerberos" host or simply the "KDC") stores a secret password for all principals
on the network. Any principal wishing to access the network or a protected network
service must first authenticate itself to the KDC before access is granted.
Kerberos was developed in 1987 by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) to protect emerging network services provided by the school's Project
Athena. When Kerberos was designed, MIT was operating 750 computers on 30 subnets
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and supporting over 5000 active users. MIT's computing environment consisted of both
distributed untrusted workstations and time-share mainframe-based systems, but there
was virtually no centralized control of the computing resources on the MIT campus and
the individual workstations were unsecured. Malicious users might subvert or otherwise
gain control of individual workstation operating systems and gain unauthorized access to
the network or masquerade as another user to gain unauthorized access to files. (Miller et
al, 1987)
The primary purpose of Kerberos was to extend the familiar time-sharing notions
of authentication, authorization and auditing to the distributed network environment
operating with untrusted workstations. To that end, Kerberos had three goals: (1)
provide both one-way and mutual authentication between principals to the granularity of a
single user and a single network service instance; (2) provide coarse access authorization
and allow services to implement specific authorization models as required while assum-
ing reliable authentication of users; and (3) allow integration of a modular accounting
system to provide accounting services for resources as required (Miller et al, 1987).
While the Kerberos protocol does have some limitations and weaknesses, the protocol
effectively achieves these goals (Bellovin and Merritt, 1990).
2. The Kerberos Protocol
a. A uthentication
Kerberos is a client/server-based protocol that relies on a trusted third
party to provide authentication services for both a network client and the network service
the client wishes to access. Thus any network application can be customized to comply
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with the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos protocol does not transmit
passwords per se over the untrusted network, but rather authenticates users and processes
at the client machine. The protocol uses a modularized 64-bit encryption algorithm to
accomplish the authentication function. The default encryption algorithm is the Digital
Encryption Standard (DES) (NIST, 1988), but any 64-bit encryption algorithm can be
used. The protocol is flexible in that the same general principle is used both for the initial
network login sequence and for subsequent network application and service access.
Figure 6 illustrates the general authentication protocol.
When initially accessing the network a client must request authentication
from the centralized Kerberos key distribution center (KDC) (i.e. Kerberos). Integral to
the KDC is a database that stores the password for every user and each "kerberized"
network application or service. Upon verifying the ID of the user, the KDC issues the
client an initial encrypted authentication ticket called a "ticket-granting ticket" (TGT).
This ticket is encrypted using the user's stored password as the seed for the encryption
algorithm. To decrypt the TGT, the client process prompts the user for their password.
The user will only be granted access to the network if they enter the correct password to
decrypt the TGT.
At this point the user is only logged onto the network; they can access
standard applications or services but they cannot yet access Kerberized applications or
services. To make the protocol as transparent to the user as possible, the protocol









Figure 6. The Kerberos authentication protocol. After (Steiner, et al., 1988)
is kept in memory on the client machine only long enough to decrypt the TGT. The TGT
is then used in lieu of a password to obtain authentication tickets for individual network
applications and services as required by the user.
Once logged onto the network, a user wishing to access a network
application or service must obtain an authentication ticket from a ticket granting server
(TGS) by submitting an authentication request and the TGT to the TGS. The TGS may or
may not reside on the same machine as the KDC. Once obtained, the application or
service ticket is then presented to the particular application server to gain access to the
application or service.
The structure of each ticket (i.e. the TGT obtained from the KDC and each
specific service ticket obtained from the TGS) is identical and is illustrated in Figure 7.







Figure 7. Contents of a Kerberos authentication ticket.
network application or service (including the TGS in the case of the initial TGT). Each
authentication ticket issued to a client process also contains another ticket that is en-
crypted with the application's (or TGS's) password. This inner ticket is not readable to
the client (or the user on whose behalf the client is operating); it may only be decrypted
by the server portion of the applicable application or service.
The inner ticket has its own structure as shown in Figure 8. Inside the
inner ticket is the client's name, the client's IP address, the server's name, the current
computer time, the ticket's lifespan, and the same session key that was issued to the client
as part of the authentication ticket, whether the authentication ticket is the original TGT
or is a specific service ticket.
To access a particular "kerberized" network application the client process
will prepare an authenticator composed of the client's name, IP address and the current
time. The authenticator is encrypted with the session key issued with the initial TGT.
The client will present this encrypted authenticator, the name of the specific service and










Figure 8. Contents of the encrypted inner ticket within a Kerberos
authentication ticket.
TGS decrypts the encrypted TGT with its unique "password"and retrieves the session key
from within the TGT. The TGT then decrypts the client's authenticator with the session
key and compares the information contained in the TGT to that contained in the
authenticator. If the client name and IP address match, and the time stamp on the
authenticator is not beyond the lifespan of the TGT, the TGS authenticates the client and
issues an authentication ticket for the specific application service specified in the request.
This new ticket has the same structure as the original TGT but a different session key for
use between the client and the application server.
The authentication process to the specific application server is identical to
that which has just been described. The authenticator and the encrypted inner ticket are
now presented to the specific application server.
b. Authorization
Kerberos provides the flexibility to allow different network services to
implement different authorization models (access control lists for example). There are
81
three ways the Kerberos authentication protocol can be extended to include authorization.
The first is by including authorization information for each network service directly in the
Kerberos database. Only authorized users are then granted specific service tickets. The
second means of providing authorization is for the system to maintain separate access
control lists (ACLs) for each service. The Kerberos protocol can be modified to provide
certified copies of the ACL in place of an authentication ticket. The certified ACL is then
presented to the ultimate service in lieu of the authentication ticket. The third way the
Kerberos protocol can be modified to provide authorization is by customizing each
individual service to maintain its own authorization information. The third authorization
method is recommended by the Kerberos developers at MIT. Library modules
implementing this authorization model using ACLs are included in the standard MIT
distribution of Kerberos. (Miller et ai, 1987)
While the Kerberos authentication model is centralized, the authorization
model is decentralized. The principle idea behind decentralized authorization is that each
service is likely to know best who the authorized users are and how to best implement
that authorization. The advantages of this model are outlined in (Miller et ai, 1987) and
will not be addressed here.
c. Accounting
Kerberos does not implement an accounting system itself, but it can
accommodate a modular accounting system to track resource usage (Miller et ai, 1987).
The modularized accounting system is used for tracking system resource usage. That
information is usually used for an organization's charge-back/computer resource billing
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policy. If a network application (e.g. the print daemon) is "kerberized" and the
organization implements a charge-back policy, then Kerberos can accommodate a
modularized accounting system to gather the necessary data.
For discussion's sake, it does not seem feasible to use a modularized
accounting system to evaluate usage and practicality of the Kerberos system itself as
Kerberos does only one thing: control access to system resources. Kerberos accom-
plishes this function through authentication and authorization. The Kerberos system itself
is Boolean in nature: either you use it or you do not; either a network application is
"Kerberized" or it is not. If an organization implements Kerberos to protect network
resources, then by default Kerberos gets used.
Evaluating the practicality of Kerberos is equally problematic. As with
most computer system/network security mechanisms, evaluating the practicality of
Kerberos is similar to precisely evaluating the practicality of life insurance. How does
one do that? The nice thing about Kerberos is that it can replace the standard login
sequence and be transparent to the user. Therefore it is only as obtrusive as the regular
login sequence. This is assuming of course that network managers and system adminis-
trators want to implement Kerberos and take advantage of the access protection it
provides.
D. PLANNING REQUIREMENTS
Specific planning requirements will vary from organization to organization. This
section simply highlights some of the issues that must be addressed before implementing
Kerberos within an organization. Subsection 1 addresses network organization issues.
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Subsection 2 discusses network service issues. Subsection 3 addresses network admin-
istration issues.
1. Network Organization and Realms
Any large-scale implementation of Kerberos (such as those at MIT (Miller, et ai,
1987)) requires considerable planning. Kerberos operates within the concept of a realm
which is similar to an Internet domain. However a realm is fundamentally different from
an Internet domain. A domain is based on a common set of network addresses that can be
divided easily into subdomains by simply parsing up the common set of addresses into
subsets which can be allocated to form subnetworks. On the other hand, a realm is an
independent administrative division or grouping of computers that cannot be divided into
"subrealms." As an application layer protocol, Kerberos uses lower level protocols only
for transmission and delivery. A host's network address is not a prerequisite for inclusion
in a particular realm. (Miller, et ai, 1987; Neuman and Steiner, 1988)
Network administrators deploying Kerberos must decide how many realms they
are going to operate at their site and how these realms will be organized. To simplify
network management it is recommended that realms mirror an organization's top-level
Internet domain name, however this may be impractical or inefficient. (Neuman and
Steiner, 1988). Small sites can operate adequately within a single realm; larger sites will
require multiple realms. For example, MIT operates with three realms supporting more
than 5,000 users and 750 computers on 30 subnets (Neuman and Steiner, 1988). These




Managers must also decide how many application servers will be installed within
each realm, where those application servers will be located both physically and logically
at the site, and what network applications/services will be protected. This section
discusses these decision issues.
a. Application Servers
(Eichin and McGregor, 1995) recommends making every local host an
application server so users can access them directly. While this may be desirable, it may
be impractical for large sites. Because a single master KDC has complete authentication
and administration authority within a particular realm, making every local host an
application server at a large single-realm site will greatly increase the workload on the
single master KDC. This will also increase the size of the KDC's database and make
database management more difficult.
The server workload issue can be solved by implementing slave servers
that contain a read-only copy of the database, but the database management issue remains.
Both the server workload and database management issues can be solved by subdividing
a large realm into a collection of smaller realms. In this case authentication between
realms is desirable but is not fully supported by the current version of Kerberos (version
4) (Miller, et al, 1987). Cross-realm authentication is supported with version 5, but
version 5 is still in the beta testing phase with many bugs left to iron out (Kohl and
Neuman, 1993).
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The decision concerning which applications and services to protect using
Kerberos is closely related to the earlier decision concerning which hosts will be
application servers. It may be desirable to have every network host provide some basic
set of "kerberized" services (e.g. rlogin, telnet, rsh, rep,ftp etc.), but it is also reasonable
to limit some applications (e.g. printer daemons and World Wide Web servers) to a few
specific machines. Freeware distributions of Kerberos include "kerberized" versions of
the standard Unix r-commands (i.e. rlogin, rep and rshelt) and most freeware distribu-
tions also include "kerberized" telnet, tftp,ftp and pop (e-mail server) applications.
Freeware distributions of Kerberos also include a library of procedures and subroutines
programmers can use to "kerberize" existing applications. The time and expense of
converting applications will depend on programmer skill and the complexity and size of
the applications managers wish to "kerberize" and make available to users. This remains
an area for further research since thesis does not address specific costs.
Another closely related issue concerns where within an organization
application servers will be placed (both physically and logically with respect to network
addressing). This point is moot for those sites that make every host an application server
for every application. Since in most sites it is unlikely every host will support every
application, this issue must also be addressed.
b. Clients
Every network host (including the application servers) for a legitimate
implementation of Kerberos will be a Kerberos client. The decision to limit the
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accessibility of other "kerberized" applications to specific hosts is no different than under
standard non-Kerberos practices.
3. Network Administration
Network administration when operating with Kerberos is only slightly more
complex than when operating without Kerberos. The added complexity results from
having to manage an additional database containing passwords for both network users
and for the network services. However, depending on an organization's security policy,
the standard passwords can be disabled thereby eliminating the need to separately manage
standard passwords. The motivation here is to make the Kerberos initialization process
transparent to the user by replacing the standard login script with one that handles the
Kerberos initialization. When a user logs into a workstation they are automatically
initialized to the KDC for that realm. All authentication requirements within that realm
will then be handled by Kerberos. From a user's standpoint the whole process is
invisible. In either case user accounts must be managed, users and network administra-
tors alike must be trained, network services must be managed, network access must be
monitored, etc. A well-planned implementation can eliminate many administrative
burdens.
E. SUMMARY
The Kerberos protocol provides authentication of users and client processes by
means of authentication tickets. The protocol also supports authorization and can
accommodate modular accounting systems to track system usage. This chapter explains
the motivation for implementing the Kerberos protocol and briefly describes how the
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protocol works. This chapter also discusses many of the planning issues that must be
addressed prior to an operational implementation of Kerberos. Kerberos is of interest to
NPS as a means to provide remote password protection to seamlessly and securely extend
LAN connectivity across the Internet.
88
VI. INTEGRATED IP/ATM LAN/WAN SITE SECURITY SURVEY
A. INTRODUCTION
The IP/ATM LAN/WAN is located in the System Technology Lab (STL) at NPS.
The STL contains both classified and unclassified computer networks/systems, but this
thesis addresses only the unclassified systems. For simplicity, the abbreviation STL is
used throughout this chapter to designate the unclassified system. This chapter docu-
ments the results of a site security survey conducted for the unclassified STL IP/ATM
LAN/WAN. This chapter is not a risk analysis per se, but merely a careful look at the
level of security for the unclassified networked computer system as well as what work
still needs to be done. Conclusions in this chapter are drawn from a comparison of the
information obtained in background research, structured interviews and free-form
interviews with the STL computing staff. Issues are described in detail in Chapter IV.
Section B briefly describes and illustrates the integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN network
topology. Results of the STL site security survey are presented in section C.
B. INTEGRATED IP/ATM LAN/WAN TOPOLOGY
Figure 9 illustrates the topology of the integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS.
(Courtney, 1996) explains this topology in detail. In general, the core of the network
consists of two Unix workstations connected together through both an IP Ethernet
interface and an ATM interface. On the left side of Figure 9, the IP Ethernet interfaces
connect the workstations to the STL subnet, which is connected to the campus backbone
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Figure 9. IP/ATM LAN/WAN topology. From (Courtney, 1996).
and then to the Internet through the campus firewall. On the right side of Figure 9, the
ATM interfaces are connected to a Cisco A- 100 ATM switch in the STL which is
connected to another A- 1 00 ATM switch located in the campus main computer center.
From the computer center our ATM link connects directly to the Monterey BayNet
regional ATM testbed.
C. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The observations and assessments made in this section are based on the issues
discussed in Chapter IV. Subsection 1 discusses administration issues. Subsection 2
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discusses environmental issues. Subsection 3 discusses software and data issues.
Subsection 4 discusses telecommunication and system access issues. Subsection 5
discusses implementation issues. Interviews include (Cochran, 1996), (McGregor, 1996)
and (Williams, 1996).
It is important to note that STL administration, operations and capabilities are
among the most challenging on campus (and certainly more challenging than commercial
organizations). Staff manning is less than desired, also a common occurrence on campus.
This and other anecdotal evidence leads us to believe that STL issues are representative
of conditions throughout NPS.
1. Administration Issues
a. System A vailability Requirements
The fundamental mission at NPS is graduate student education and
research. LAN/WAN connectivity and the availability of unclassified computing
resources are essential to that mission, yet system availability requirements for the STL
resources are not documented. Assumptions amongst the STL computing staff are
informal but consistent. One staff member stated the system availability requirement was
98% (or system down time not to exceed 28 minutes per day), while another was
uncertain but stated that system down time was not to exceed 1 minutes a day which
equates to a 99.99% availability requirement.
System availability is not currently tracked or explicitly monitored.
Because students or faculty are quick to inform staff members of network problems,
monitoring and tracking system availability is considered a waste of manpower.
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However, monitoring and tracking system availability not only serves to notify system
administrators of network problems but also to document the performance and effective-
ness of various controls. Automated network monitoring scripts such as those described
in (Edwards, 1996) and (Erdogan, 1996) can simplify this task thereby freeing up staff
members for other duties.
Without explicit system availability requirements and accurate system
performance monitoring, there is no tangible means to evaluate the effectiveness of
networked computer system security. The STL staff must explicitly define and document
the system availability requirements for the unclassified computing resources. Extending
the capabilities of the (Edwards, 1996) and (Erdogan, 1996) automatic monitoring
systems to include system availability and analysis results is a worthwhile area for future
work.
b. Security and Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs)
Security and acceptable use policies (AUPs) for NPS in general are
described in (NPS, 1992) and (NPS, 1995) respectively. No additional policies are
specified for the STL.
Limited NPS security policies are posted in the STL but are not enforced.
For example, disallowing food and drink around the computer equipment may be a
prudent policy, but it is not enforced and therefore is unheeded by STL users who
apparently do not see the utility of the policy. In this case nonenforcement correctly
implies irrelevance. Nonenforcement simply reinforces a perception that the NPS
administration, the STL computing staff, or both, have a myopic view of the scope of
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computer security or do not understand the need for it with regards to unclassified
systems.
The emphasis here is not so much on the enforcement of the limited
policies but on their enforceability, adequacy and appropriateness. Enforcement ability is
not so much having staff police users actions (a counterproductive approach) as it is
having policies that make sense to users as common practice. Policies are not static; they
must reflect the nature, culture and environment of the organization. Therefore the STL
computing staff ought to critically examine the existing policies. It is worthwhile to
identify and eliminate policies that are unimportant, irrelevant or unenforceable. It is
worthwhile to have policies which are truly necessary and which reflect the climate and
culture of the organization and the needs of all stakeholders. To improve acceptance of
the policies, users must be involved in the policy process.
c. Contingency Planning
As discussed in Chapter IV, contingency planning is dependent upon
system availability requirements. NPS directives state that a "contingency plan will be
developed for each AIS where a disruption of services would have a critical impact on
mission accomplishment" (NPS, 1992, pg. 17). Assuming that LAN/WAN connectivity
and the availability of unclassified computing resources are required to accomplish the
NPS mission, then according to this directive, a contingency plan is required for all
unclassified systems.
The STL staff have conducted a rudimentary risk analysis and developed
limited contingency plans for their classified resources but have not done so for their
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unclassified systems. It is safe to assume that availability of the unclassified systems is
much more critical than that of the classified systems as the unclassified resources are
used more often by more people. Therefore a thorough risk analysis and contingency
plan needs to be developed for the unclassified IP-based resources as well. ATM
resources are experimental and not mission critical.
d. Roles and Responsibilities
With only one temporary and three permanent members, the STL comput-
ing staff is seriously undermanned to adequately accomplish necessary security functions
in addition to their other duties and responsibilities. However, the STL network manager
has taken steps to obtain external funding and increase the number of staff members to
six permanent positions plus the one temporary position currently filled. If approved by
NPS administration, this will greatly improve the distribution of labor. Assigning one of
these positions the primary responsibility of network security will also help improve the
security posture of the STL, since more time might be devoted to network security. To
their credit however, the STL computing staff (even though undermanned) does provide
exceptional support to the faculty and students.
2. Environmental Issues
a. Natural Disasters
The only environmental threat the STL staff seems even remotely con-
cerned about is excessive heat within the computer room. This is understandable as there
already have been some heat-related hardware failures. Steps already have been taken to
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fund, procure and install an air conditioning system in the STL to remedy this situation.
The system is expected to be installed by the end of the year.
While excessive heat is the only concern of the STL staff, other environ-
mental threats certainly exist. The threat of fire is always present. The computer room is
carpeted presenting the threats associated with static electricity and dust. Electrical
power is not necessarily stable. However, few controls are in place to protect against
these other threats. Automatic heat or smoke detectors are required by local directive
(NPS, 1992) but are not present. Automatic sprinklers are not installed and the nearest
fire extinguisher is outside the computer room and thirty yards down the passageway.
Uninterruptible power supplies and surge protectors are not installed.
The risks associated with these other threats may already have been
considered but nothing has been documented. Without a formal risk assessment and
documented contingency plan, it is impossible to adequately assess the importance of the
other threats or obtain the necessary resources to adequately protect against them. As
mentioned above, the STL staff must complete a formal risk assessment and develop a
contingency plan for their unclassified systems. It is possible that some of these physical
safeguards might be funded by campus resources rather than reimbursable research.
b. Human Disasters
The STL computing staff considers authorized system users to be the
greatest threat to the security of the STL systems. Ordinarily the typical user is a student
or faculty member interested only in their relevant application programs. They give little
thought to issues such as password security. Most have only a general knowledge of file
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permissions and how to effectively use them, despite the requirement for annual computer
security training for all personnel. The annual training provided by the NPS administra-
tion (typically a short briefing lasting less than 30 minutes) is woefully inadequate. The
STL staff cannot rely on this limited training but must take the necessary steps to ensure
users are adequately trained.
Physical security is minimal. Laboratory spaces are protected by cipher
lock when unmanned. Inside the labs, network hardware is freely accessible. Network
cabling and concentrators are not physically secure and hence are vulnerable to either
deliberate attack or accidental disconnection by users or cleaning personnel. The main
network file servers and ATM switches are also freely accessible. While it is under-
standable that the ATM switches are accessible due to ongoing research in ATM network
technology, it is unwise to allow free physical access to the main network file server.
Likewise, the Kerberos key distribution center for the STL test implementation of the
Kerberos authentication and authorization system is freely accessible to anyone. This is
unsatisfactory for a meaningful implementation of Kerberos. These important pieces of
the network architecture need to be physically secure inside ordinarily locked rooms.
3. Software and Data Issues
a. Configuration Management
The STL staff tracks system software configuration reasonably well, but
they do not closely track application software installed for course work or research
projects. There is no mechanism besides notification by students or faculty that applica-
tion software is no longer needed. Unneeded application software not only takes up disk
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space that may be required for other programs or files, but it may also interfere with the
proper configuration of newly installed software. This configuration problem will always
exist, but removing unnecessary applications may reduce the possibility of misconfig-
uration to some degree. An administrative policy and an adequate number of administra-
tors are needed.
Another vulnerability exists with the availability of CGI and perl scripts
on home pages. CGI and perl scripts may leak information about the host system
configuration that hackers can exploit. The simple fact that a script's source is readable
simply by selecting the "View Source" option on the browser allows an intruder the
opportunity to study a script and search for ways it can be exploited. Additionally, scripts
can inadvertently pass remote user input that contains shell metacharacters to system
procedure calls such as evalQ, execO,popenQ, systemQ. The point here is not that these
system procedure calls should not be use but that script writers need to sanitize user input
for proper form and content before passing the input to the shell for execution. With
execQ and systemQ, script writers can also execute external programs by sending external
data directly to the program rather than going through a shell. (Stein, 1996) provides an
excellent discussion of the vulnerabilities associated with CGI and perl scripts. (Stein,
1996)
Security of CGI and perl scripts is only as good as the design and testing
of the scripts. The STL staff has implemented adequate procedures to keep scripts in-
accessible to external hosts until they have been tested for security. CGI and perl scripts
are tested and validated on an isolated internal server before being made available on the
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STL web server accessible by Internet users. This practice ensures an acceptable level of
security within the STL.
b. Integrity and Confidentiality
Confidentiality and integrity of most system software and data are not
major concerns for unclassified systems. Integrity and confidentiality are maintained
primarily by controlling access to the network (discussed below).
c. System Backups
System backups are woefully inadequate in STL. Full system backups are
done only quarterly; incremental backups are attempted weekly. Even when full system
backups are conducted only system software is backed up, user data files are not. The
attitude and policy of the STL staff is that users must backup their own data files. This is
certainly prudent advice and users should attempt to do so to as great an extent as
possible, but user backups are infeasible for large files. When questioned about this
policy the STL network manager stated that users need only inform the STL staff and
appropriate disk space on a mirrored drive will be provided, yet users routinely are not
aware of this. This demonstrates an additional need for a user indoctrination and training
program for the STL.
Two recent hard disk failures have further demonstrated the need for more
frequent and reliable backups. In one case the failure resulted in lost research documenta-
tion that had been stored in group accounts. To little avail, one STL system administrator
spent the better part of a week trying to recover the lost files. Many of the lost files were
written by users who have long since departed and backups were not available. It is
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unreasonable to request faculty members keep backup copies of all ongoing or completed
research documentation on floppy disks. The second case was only a partial failure
affecting application files. The files that were affected were able to be moved to another
portion of the disk before any files were permanently lost. However, proper reconfigura-
tion of the files has not been guaranteed.
The STL staff need to improve their backup policy. Given the nature of
today's technology, system users reasonably expect adequate backups of all files includ-
ing user data files. Current backup practices within the STL do not sufficiently assure the
availability of computing resources and services. There are plans to implement an
automated tape backup system with future upgrades to optical disks. This is a step in the
right direction.
4. Telecommunications and System Access Issues
a. Access Control
Open computing and maintaining system availability are both essential for
the STL. Access security in the STL is good but the network is still vulnerable. While the
current Internet connection must pass through the campus firewall, the ATM connection
does not. This recognized risk is currently acceptable because only permanent virtual
circuits (PVCs) are configured and the risk is minimal. However, as experience with
ATM expands and the use of switched virtual circuits (SVCs) become common, this
practice will become unacceptable since the ATM call setup procedure may be vulnerable
to password compromise or other threats just as with standard Internet connections. If
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plans to move forward with ATM are implemented, the STL staff must examine and plan
ATM security now rather than as an afterthought.
Internal campus network security has also improved considerably since the
December 1995 security incident. TCP_wrapper]0 is used on all campus traffic and
passwords are required for remote login and telnet sessions between campus subnets. If a
sniffing program is somehow installed inside the firewall, the network is still vulnerable
to common password-sniffing attacks. Although not a requirement, sniffer program
detection for all NPS LANs is performed periodically. However, passwords are still sent
across the network in the clear for all remote login sessions. This is discussed in the next
section.
b. Identification, Authentication and Authorization
Password security remains the greatest threat to network security.
Passwords are transmitted in the clear over the network whether that network is the
campus backbone or the Internet. Additionally, passwords stored on the system are
encrypted but the file is world-readable. Although CRACK* ] is run periodically to check
the security of Unix passwords, there are no guarantees that a "good" password (i.e. one
10 TCPwrapper is a utility program that allows system administrators to customize their
network access security policy by specifying which network hosts are granted or denied access to
specific network services as specified in the host, allow and the host, deny files respectively.
1
' CRACK is a utility program that checks the security of user passwords. The program
encrypts common dictionary words and then compares these words against the system's
password file. If a match is found, the matched password is flagged as insecure. The dictionary
can be customized and expanded to meet the needs of the organization. For example, NPS
includes ship names and hull numbers in its CRACK dictionary. Information on CRACK is
available at http://www.ja.net/newsfiles/janinfo/cert/Muffett/Crack-4. 1-readme.txt
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not discovered by CRACK) has not been compromised by a password-sniffing attack.
Additionally, although passwords are required for remote login sessions originating from
any machine outside the STL subnet, the default password for a user's STL account is
their main NPS Computer Center password. Any compromise of the main campus
password file is likely to compromise the STL password file as well. The STL does not
require users to use different passwords than their main campus password nor are users
required to periodically change their passwords. This is an understandable local policy
since network security monitoring is not coordinated campus-wide. Furthermore, the
STL does not implement shadow passwords as recommended by CERT (CERT, 1996c). 12
c. Nonrepudiation
Nonrepudiation is not an identified user need and is therefore not applica-
ble to the STL.
d. Integrity and Confidentiality
Integrity and confidentiality of passwords during network transmission is
far more important than integrity and confidentiality of data during transmission. This is
because data can be encrypted, but encryption can be broken if passwords are not secure.
Preventative and corrective actions are needed because passwords are not protected
during network transmission. The option of data confidentiality is a desirable feature for
some users but is only supported by ad hoc usage of routines such as the Unix crypt
command, a trivial encryption routine at best (Curry, 1990).
12 A shadow password system, does not have encrypted passwords in the password field




(1) IP-to-ATM Connections. Only preliminary security implica-
tions of IP and ATM interaction have been considered by the STL and NPS computing
center staff. Admittedly the security implications are not clear due to the immaturity of
ATM technology. Nevertheless ifATM implementation and use within the STL is to
progress, security must be planned in advance rather than added as an afterthought. This
is an important area for future study before operational deployment ofATM at NPS. NPS
ATM researchers might also consider membership in the closed ATM Forum, but true
security will only emerge from open solutions compatible with IP and endorsed by the
IETF. In any case, the major ATM deficiencies identified in (Courtney, 1996) must be
addressed prior to large-scale use ofATM is advisable.
(2) Direct-dial Telephone Lines. The STL does not have direct
modem access. However, the NPS Computing Center and the NPS Computer Science
Department subnets do have modem access. Because the STL subnet is accessible from
these subnets via the campus backbone, its security is dependent upon the security of
these subnets. The STL subnet may be compromised if one of the other subnets are
compromised. The STL staff must take the necessary steps to secure their own subnet
independent of the security associated with other subnets around the campus. This might
be partly accomplished by requiring passwords uniquely different than those used for
other subnets. This can also be accomplished if a one-time password mechanism such as
S-Key or secure login mechanism such as Kerberos is used for dial-in access on the other
subnets.
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(3) Multicast Traffic. Multicasting is essential to the work the
IIRG is doing with regards to practical internetworking. Because there are no direct
security hooks in current multicast protocols, current practice is to use higher-level
encryption for data secrecy and/or integrity. The work being done by the IIRG does not
require such strict confidentiality and integrity measures. What is required is assurance
against denial of service. Certain MBone tools have been made publicly available via
home pages using tools such as mrinfo and mtrace. Granting public user-friendly access
to these tools provides important benefits without opening security vulnerabilities as
previously assumed. (Erdogan, 1996) provides a detailed examination of these issues, a
technical assessment of software vulnerabilities and a secure working implementation
which demonstrates the value of this approach.
5. Implementation Issues
a. Effectiveness and Efficiency
There are no metrics in place by which to measure the effectiveness or
efficiency of computer security. System availability is not monitored or tracked. Labor
hours expended on security related tasks are not documented, nor are the number or
frequency of unauthorized access attempts. Until the STL staff either implements
procedures or software tools to automatically monitor such metrics, effectiveness and
efficiency will go unmeasured. This is a valuable area for further student research.
b. Life-Cycle Costs
Security has not been planned for (or designed into) the unclassified
systems, other than out-of-the-box operating system security. There is no documented
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risk analysis against which to compare costs. Life-cycle costs cannot be evaluated until a
complete risk analysis is accomplished. The same metrics used to measure effectiveness
and efficiency can be used to track the costs associated with the presence (or lack) of
security controls.
c. Convenience andAcceptance
While it is true that security controls must be convenient and accepted by
the users if they are to be effective, it is also true that the lack of security controls must be
convenient and accepted by the users. The lack of software and data backups has
inconvenienced STL users in the past. Unless the present haphazard backup capabilities
are changed, significant damage is likely to occur in the future.
The STL computing staff must actively seek both faculty and student input
concerning network security. All system users (faculty, staff and students alike) must
have a voice in security discussions and decisions. The computing staff needs to actively
seek input, because most users will not volunteer such input but will rather complain
amongst themselves that service is unsatisfactory.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter briefly describes the integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN network
topology at NPS. Section C documents in detail the observations and conclusions from a
site security survey. The conclusions drawn in Section C are largely based on the issues
discussed in Chapter IV.
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VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS - KERBEROS INSTALLATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter explains the steps taken to install, configure and test Kerberos for our
limited implementation. Section B documents the steps taken to obtain the software.
Section C briefly describes the steps taken to install the Kerberos software. Section D
describes configuration and testing. Section E briefly describes firewall configuration
requirements. Section F discusses the significance of remote applications with respect to
network security and the steps taken to install and configure a remote application.
Section G documents various configuration and technical support options available.
Section H describes the methods we used to distribute Kerberos passwords to both local
and remote users.
To more easily examine the feasibility of Kerberos we have limited our test
implementation to a total of five network hosts and a portable laptop computer. Because
the Kerberos protocol is implemented strictly in software, no special equipment is
required. Locally we have installed Kerberos on three Unix workstations and a net-
worked PC running Windows 95. Remotely we have installed Kerberos on a portable
laptop at NPS (also running Windows 95) and a single Unix workstation at Old Domin-
ion University (ODU) in Norfolk Virginia. We classify the laptop as a remote machine
since laptops are typically used for remote computing while traveling. Figure 10 lists the
general steps required to implement Kerberos.
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• Install Kerberos software on machines at your site
• Set up a Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC)
• Configure Kerberos application servers
• Configure Kerberos application clients
• Add users and their passwords to the KDC
• Inform users about Kerberos
• Turn off "non-kerberized" applications (optional)
Figure 10. Steps required to install Kerberos. After (Eichin
and McGregor, 1995).
For our limited implementation we established a single realm with the name
STL.NPS.NAVY.MIL to match the unique domain name of our LAN. The realm
consists of a single master Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC), two application
servers and six user clients on the six machines described above.
B. OBTAINING THE KERBEROS SOFTWARE
Most Kerberos source code is freely available from MIT and its authorized
distribution agents via anonymous^?/?. While the source code is free, it incorporates
64-bit encryption and is therefore considered a munition by the U.S. Government. As
such it is subject to strict export restrictions and cannot be placed on well knownftp
servers. MIT freeware information is available at:
http://athena-dist. mit. edu/pub/kerberos
We obtained both Kerberos version 4 and Kerberos version 5 software from
Cygnus Network Security (CNS). Details are described below.
1. Version 4
Information and instructions for obtaining a copy of the CNS Kerberos version 4
source code is available at:
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http://www. cygnus. com/product/cns/sources. html
Simply print and complete the Cygnus Network Security CNS (V4) Package Request
Form and fax the completed form to Cygnus at the number printed on the form. Cygnus
will
e-mail the ftp location in a few business days. Due to the export restrictions, Cygnus
must have a signed form on file before they will release theftp site information. Win-
dows binaries (compatible with Windows 95, Windows 3. IX and Windows NT) are
freely available at the anonymousftp site.
In addition to free source code, Kerberos binaries are also available for a fee
(from a differentftp server) for those systems listed in Figure 1 1 . The fee is for technical
support as described in Section E.
2. Version 5
Due to configuration and testing failures associated with the Kerberos version 4
Windows binaries, we purchased a special one-month support contract from Cygnus. The
Kerberos version 5 binaries for Solaris and Windows, and the Windows and "C" source
Hardware
Architecture Operating Systems
Sparc SunOS 4.1.3, Solaris 2.4
HPPA HP-UX 9.05, 10.01
RX/6000 AIX3.2, 4.1
SGI IRIX 5.3
i386 (and up) Linux
Figure 11. CNS supported systems (CNS, 1996).
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code were included with the contract. Once Cygnus received a signed nondisclosure
statement and payment for the support contract they provided iheftp site and the appro-
priate information for obtaining support. The details of the support contract are discussed
in Section E.
C. INSTALLATION
This section describes installation procedures for the Kerberos version 4 software.
Upgrading to Kerberos Version 5 remains as future work.
1. Unix Machines
"Root" access is required to install the Kerberos software. Detailed installation
steps are given in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995) and are not repeated here. The docu-
mentation is available on-line at:
http://www. cygnus. com/library/cns/installjoc. html
It is advisable to print a copy of the documentation for use during the installation and
configuration process, rather than trying to read the documentation on-line while install-
ing the software. Figure 12 lists the general steps required to install Kerberos on a Unix
machine.
The source code is distributed as a zipped archive file and must be unzipped and
extracted using the Unix gunzip and tar utility programs respectively. We compiled the
source and then installed the software on both Sun and SGI machines. Locally, we have
Kerberos installed on a Sun SPARCserver 1000 running Solaris 2.4, a Sun SPARCstation
20 also running Solaris 2.4, and an SGI Indigo2 workstation running IRIX 5.3. Remotely
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• Download Kerberos archive file from anonymous ftp site
• Unzip and extract Kerberos files
• Run usr/kerberos/configure
• Verify krb.conf and krb. realms files are correctly
configured
Figure 12. General steps required to install Kerberos on a Unix
workstation (Eichin and McGregor, 1995).
we have Kerberos installed on a single SGI Indigo2 Extreme workstation at Old Domin
ion University (ODU) in Norfolk Virginia, also running IRIX 5.3.
The installation process is partially automated using a configuration script
included with the software. By default CNS Kerberos version 4 files are installed in the
/usr/kerberos directory. Although it is possible to install Kerberos in a different directory
it is not recommended as installation and configuration becomes problematic. To install
the Kerberos software run the configuration script by typing:
% /usr/kerberos /install /configure
The configuration script will prompt for the realm name and automatically
configure the /usr/kerberos/lib/krb. confand /usr/kerberos/lib/krb. realms configuration
files. If the realm name is not the same as the Internet domain name for the site then
follow the procedures documented in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995) for manually
configuring these two files. Regardless, it is advisable to verify the entries in both these
files.




The lower case portion of each entry represents the domain name and the uppercase




Likewise, the first two lines in the krb.conf file will be similar to:
MKTG . CORP . ORG
MKTG.CORP.ORG kerberos.corp.org admin server
For our implementation the first two lines of the krb.conf file are:
STL.NPS.NAVY.MIL
STL.NPS.NAVY.MIL kerberos.stl.nps.navy.mil admin server
The first line is automatically added by the configuration script to indicate the default
realm for this machine. Do not change this line. The second line identifies the KDC for
the realm. Manually edit these files if the lines do not accurately represent your configur-
ation.
2. Microsoft Windows Machines
Installing Kerberos on Windows machines is much more straightforward than
installing Kerberos on Unix platforms. (Gilmore and McGregor, 1995) provides detailed
instructions for installing the Windows binaries and is available on-line at:
http://www. cygnus. com/library/ens/windowsJoe. html
Again, it is advisable to print a copy of the documentation for use during the installation
process.
The Windows binaries are distributed as a zipped file that must be unzipped and
expanded with the DOS pkunzip utility program. Copy the zipped file into the c: \cns
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directory before it is unzipped. This is the default installation directory and must first be
created, unless installing an upgrade from an earlier version of Kerberos into the already-
existing directory. (Gilmore and McGregor, 1995) provides detailed instructions for
creating a CNS program group and the necessary program items within the CNS program
group. Locally, we have installed Kerberos on a networked Pentium PC and on a
portable laptop for use during travel.
D. CONFIGURATION AND TESTING KERBEROS
Detailed configuration procedures are presented in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995)
and are not repeated here. The documentation is available on-line at:
http://www. cygnus. com/library/ens/install toe. html
Once again, printing a copy for use during the configuration process is helpful. Extensive
manual pages are also supplied with the software distribution.
1. Key Distribution Center (KDC)
a. Configuration
Configuration and administration of the KDC is involved yet straightfor-
ward. We followed the configuration steps presented in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995)
without difficulty. Figure 13 lists the general steps required to create, configure and
populate the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC). These procedures require "root"
(i.e. superuser) access and are partially automated using initialization and configuration
programs. These programs simplify the configuration process by prompting for any
required information. The single KDC for our realm is configured on the Sun
SPARCserver 1 000 described above. As specified in the configuration instructions, we
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• Run kdbjnit to create the KDC database
• Run kdbjedit to add the first user
• Configure kadmin ACLs
• Populate the KDC database using kadmin (or kdb_edit)
• Start kerberos and kadmind daemons
• Update network letclrc file (or equivalent)
• Test for proper KDC configuration with kinit
Figure 13. General steps required to create, configure and populate
the KDC database (Eichin and McGregor, 1995).
added the alias kerberos.stl.nps.navy.mil for the hostname of our KDC to the system
/etc/hosts file.
The first step in the configuration process is to run the kdbjnit program to
create the KDC password database. The first user (i.e. root as software installer) is
entered into the database using the kdbedit program to edit the database directly.
Additional users also can be added using kdbedit but it is much easier to populate the
database using the kadmin program. The kadmin program is enabled in the next step.
kdbjedit differs from kadmin in that kdbedit can access the database only from
the machine on which the KDC resides whereas kadmin can access the database from any
host within the realm. For this reason, access to the database using kadmin is controlled
by three access control lists (ACLs) that contain the names of individuals who are
authorized to add, modify or get information. The ACLs are stored as the files
admin acl. add, admin acl.mod and admin acl.get respectively. These files must be
manually configured using a text editor.
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With at least one user entered in the database the next step is to start the
Kerberos authentication server and the database administration server (i.e. kadmind). The
kadmind daemon enables kadmin program. Start these processes by typing:
% kerberos &
% kadmind -n &
The & causes these processes to run in the background. The -n option allows kadmin to
fetch the master database key from the master key cache file rather than requiring the
database administrator to enter the master key each time kadmin is run. (Note: The
database administrator must still enter their admin password when executing one of the
commands from within the kadmin program.) Add these two commands to the network
/etc/rc file (or equivalent) to ensure Kerberos is automatically restarted in the event the
networked Kerberos authentication server must be rebooted.
The final steps in configuring the KDC are to populate the database and to
test the administration and authentication functions of the KDC. We populated the
database with a limited number of principals (i.e. users) using the kadmin program. The
add_new_key command (ank for short) within kadmin is used to add principals to the
database.
b. Testing
Basic testing procedures are provided in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995).
We initially tested kadmin by changing passwords for the database administrator as
described in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995). No difficulties were encountered. We also
tested kadmin by querying the database with the get_entry command (get for short) to
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ensure the database had actually been populated. This is an important step as we
discovered when Professor Glen Wheless, our research partner at ODU, was unable to
initialize to the KDC. Running get to troubleshoot the error indicated he had not been
entered into our KDC database. Running ank and adding Professor Wheless as an
authorized network principal (i.e. user) cleared this problem.
We tested the authentication server portion of the KDC by running the
kinit command from both local and remote hosts. The proper syntax is:
% kinit username
Initial tests from local machines returned a "Principal unknown" error indicating that the
principal (i.e. username) had not been added to the database or that kinit was searching
the wrong KDC. However we were able to successfully initialize by using the -r option
with kinit to specify the realm. The proper syntax for this is:
% kinit -r username@realm
Upon further investigation, we discovered that this is a common error and is documented
in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995). To avoid having to use the -r option, add
/usr/kerberos/bin prior to /usr/bin in your path variable. We discovered quite by accident
that this is required because the Solaris operating system is shipped with a default,
different version of kinit installed in /usr/bin. Without redefining the path variable we





For our implementation the Sun SPARCserver 1000 and the Sun
SPARCstation 20 are configured as application servers. Again we followed the configu-
ration steps presented in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995) without difficulty. We configured
the application servers to support the "kerberized" versions of the Berkeley r-command
applications (i.e. rlogin, rep, and rsh), but we did not disable the standard versions of the
applications. Users select one version or another by specifying the complete path for the
application on the command line when running the application (e.g.
/urs/kerberos/bin/rlogin), or by placing /usr/kerberos/bin prior to /usr/bin in the path
variable as discussed earlier. No other "kerberized" applications (e.g. telnet oxftp) are
enabled. Figure 14 lists the general steps required to configure a Kerberos application
server.
The first step required to configure a machine as a "kerberized" applica-
tion server is to add a service instance and password for that server to the KDC. (Recall
every "kerberized" service/server combination requires a password.) To configure the
• Add service instance to the KDC using kadmin.
• Configure the service on the application server with ksrvutil add.
• Change the service password with ksrvutil change.
• Update the /etc/inetd. conf file
.
• Test the service.
• Turn off "non-kerberized" versions of the service.
Figure 14. General steps required to configure Kerberos application servers
(Eichin and McGregor, 1995).
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"kerberized" Berkeley r-command suite on the server servername first run kadmin then at
the admin prompt enter the following:
admin: ank rcmd. servername
You are prompted for a password. At this point the password can be simple as it soon
will be changed to something only the server and the KDC know.
To configure the service on the server itself, first log in to the server as
"root" then type:
%ksrvutil add
Again you are prompted for the service's password. Enter the same password used when
adding the service to the KDC. Next run the ksrvutil change program to automatically
change the simple password to something only the KDC and the application server
knows. The correct syntax is:
% ksrvutil change
Finally, update the /etc/inetd.conf file as specified in (Eichin and McGregor, 1995) and
test the application server.
b. Testing
Full operational testing of the application servers cannot be done until
clients are configured. However, simply installing Kerberos on the KDC machine and the
application server machine makes them client machines as well. Testing the application
servers with client machines is discussed below. Initial communications between the
KDC and the application server can be tested prior to running ksrvutil change by typing:
% kinit rcmd. servername
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Refer to (Eichin and McGregor, 1995) for troubleshooting hints ifkinit fails. Destroy all




(1) Configuration. As mentioned above, Unix machines can be
configured as Kerberos clients simply by installing the Kerberos software as described in
Section C. Therefore the two application servers are also configured as user clients.
Additionally, the SGI Indigo2 workstation at NPS and the SGI Indigo2 Extreme worksta-
tion at ODU are configured as clients. Figure 1 5 lists some basic services that can be
included in the /etc/services file on each client machine. Only kerberos and kpasswd are
necessary to allow principals to initialize to the KDC. klogin or eklogin is required to
enable the "kerberized" rlogin application (with or without encryption respectively).
Other services or "kerberized" applications (such as kpop, a "kerberized e-mail server
daemon) can be added as required.
Port/
Service Protocol Comments
kerberos 750/udp # Kerberos (server) udp
kerberos 750/tcp # Kerberos (server) top
kpasswd 761 /top # Kerberos "passwd"
klogin 543/tcp # Kerberos authenticated
rlogin
eklogin 2105/tcp # Kerberos encrypted rlogin
kshell 544/tcp # and remote shell
Figure 15. Kerberos version 4 services and port numbers (Cygnus,
1996).
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(2) Testing. Operational testing consists of attempting to access
the services provided by the application servers. Prior to testing, ensure /usr/kerberos/bin
is placed in the path variable ahead of /usr/bin. In our case only the "kerberized"
r-commands are configured. Our tests consisted of initializing to the KJDC with kinit and
testing the rlogin service from all clients to both application servers. We ran both
unencrypted and encrypted rlogin sessions. The proper syntax for this sequence of tests
is:
% kinit username
% rlogin servername # unencrypted session
% rlogin -x servername # encrypted session
Tests between local clients and the servers proved successful. However,
testing the remote client at ODU has been unsuccessful. All attempts to initialize to the
KDC up to this point have resulted in a sendtokdc: retry count exceeded error.
According (Eichin and McGregor, 1995) this indicates that kinit cannot reach the KDC
and the most likely cause is a misconfigured krb.conf. The krb.confand krb. realms files
were correct, but to verify these results we deleted the krb.confTile and re-ran the
configure installation and configuration script. The same results were obtained on
subsequent tests.
We are fairly certain that the problem is not with the client software itself
or a problem with the client configuration because the initialization attempts are being
recorded in the kerberos.log log file indicating the client is reaching the KDC but the
KDC is not responding to the request. Requesting technical support from Cygnus to
solve this problem proved to be of little value since our support contract covers only
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version 5. Time and schedule constraints did not permit resolution of the problem
without technical support, and as we move to implement Kerberos version 5 this problem
with version 4 remains unresolved.
b. Microsoft Windows Clients
(1) Configuration. (Gilmore and McGregor, 1995) describe the
steps required to configure Kerberos for Windows. The krb.rea and krb.con (DOS
versions of the krb. realms and krb. conf files) must be configured during installation
exactly as on the Unix machines. We installed and configured our Windows clients
according to (Gilmore and McGregor, 1995). The networked PC and the portable laptop
are configured as clients.
(2) Testing. Testing the Windows 95 clients also proved to be
problematic. All attempts to initialize to the KDC using a Windows 95 client resulted in
the same sendjokdc: retry count exceeded error. Both the krb.con and krb.rea files
(i.e. the DOS equivalents to the krb. confand krb. realms files) were configured according
to (Gilmore and McGregor, 1995). Posting our problem to the comp.protocols.kerberos
USENET newsgroup did not yield any useful responses and technical assistance was not
available since CNS advised that Kerberos version 4 was not supported. As with our
remote Unix client, this version 4 problem remains unresolved. At the time of this
writing we are replacing our Kerberos version 4 Windows implementation and progress-
ing with version 5 implementation.
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E. FIREWALL CONFIGURATION
Figure 1 5 lists various Kerberos services together with the corresponding trans-
port layer protocol (TCP or UDP) and network port numbers that each uses. If your
network security architecture includes a firewall, it must be configured to allow these
service/port combinations to pass. The IP address for each "kerberized" host may also be
required depending on your firewall. The firewall configuration for our implementation
is listed in Figure 16. Local clients need not be included in the firewall configuration
Local Servers:
131.120.64.5
spot . stl . nps . navy . mil






kerberos 750/udp # Kerberos (server) udp
kerberos 750/tcp # Kerberos (server) tcp
kpasswd 761 /tcp # Kerberos "passwd"
klogin 543/tcp # Kerberos authenticated rlogin
eklogin 2105/tcp # Kerberos encrypted rlogin
kpop 1109/tcp # Pop with Kerberos
kshell 544/tcp # and remote shell
Figure 16. Firewall configuration for the NPS Kerberos
implementation.
table. The benefit of Kerberos remains that a particular host does not need to be trusted




Successful implementation of Kerberos is measured by the ability of remote users
to securely access our system and conduct useful work. Our measure of success was
secure access to our system by Professor Wheless and the successful execution on our
system of the Vis5D application software used by Professor Wheless at ODU.
1. VisSD Download and Installation
The latest version of the Vis5D application software (Hibbard, 1996) is available
at:
http://www. ssec. wise. edu/~billh/vis5d. html
Both source and executable code is available. Downloading unknown or unfamiliar
executable code from the Internet is not recommended as a general rule, but we chose to
download the executables for two reasons. First, inspecting source code for security
vulnerabilities or mischievous code is not effective. Second, this particular software is
written by a reliable source and was recommended by a trusted colleague.
2. Execution
We tested the Vis5D software locally to ensure we correctly installed and config-
ured the software. However, Professor Wheless could not securely access our system to




While Cygnus distributes the Kerberos source code at no charge, technical support
requires payment. Cygnus offers a variety of standard support packages for their
Kerberos distribution. These support packages for a single realm are listed in Figure 17.
Due to configuration difficulties with the Kerberos version 4 Windows binaries
we contracted for a special one-month support agreement with Cygnus. Because our
Kerberos implementation is only experimental at this stage, Cygnus agreed to customize a
support contract to fit our particular needs. We purchased a one-month contract for
$1 ,000. Our sole purpose for the support agreement was to obtain assistance with the
configuration of the Kerberos version 4 binaries for Windows. We did not discover the
similar problem with the remote Unix client at ODU until after the support contract was
obtained.
Cygnus relies exclusively on electronic mail to report software problems/bugs and
to obtain assistance. An automated report generation program (send-pr) is included in the
supported distribution of the Kerberos software which is not included in the freeware
distribution. This automatic reporting procedure proved to be one more obstacle to
hurdle. Due to the short duration of our contract we did not take the time to install send-
pr but instead used standard electronic mail to obtain assistance. While Cygnus attempts
to answer all reports within 24 hours, it was two days before we received a reply to our
report.
As mentioned above, our sole purpose for obtaining support was to solve the
perceived Kerberos version 4 configuration problem with the Windows 95 clients.
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University $ 9,000 $ 15,000 custom
Government $ 24,000 $ 49,995 custom
Commercial $ 35,000 $ 60,000 custom
Client Support (cost per client):
Same as PC or Mac
Server Client Unix
University included $ 1,500 $ 1,500
Government included $ 2,500 $ 2,000
Commercial included $ 5,000 $ 2,500
Feature Support (in addition to base prices above):
CNS Developer's Kit (CDK)
( Support for Kerberos libraries)
Existing CDK customer $ 5,000
Non-CDK customer $ 15,000
Hand-held Authenticator $ 5,000
AFS Support $ 25,000
New dot on Matrix custom
Multiple realms or slave KDCs
at multiple sites custom
Figure 17. Standard support agreements available from Cygnus for CNS Kerberos
distribution (Powers, 1996).
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However Cygnus technical support informed us in their reply to our problem report that
our contract was for version 5 only. It was our understanding that the support contract
was for Kerberos version 4. Cygnus was very helpful and flexible in customizing a
contract for us so we can only attribute this misunderstanding to mis-communication
between the parties. Therefore while we pursue a version 5 installation our version 4
implementation difficulties remain unresolved. We are removing the version 4 distribu-
tion to eliminate the possibility of mismatched software versions.
H. KERBEROS PASSWORD DISTRIBUTION
1. Local Users
Passwords are distributed to local users face-to-face. Users must see a system
administrator to establish both a local account and to be entered in the Kerberos database.
The Kerberos database entry does not have to be the same as the local account user ID
and password. However, making the two the same and including the Kerberos initialize
procedure in the login script is recommended. This makes the Kerberos initialization
procedure transparent to the user.
2. Remote Users
Passwords for remote users can be distributed over the telephone. Our procedure
is to telephone the remote user and have a trusted individual who knows the remote user
authenticate them either by their voice or by some unique information only the two share.




This chapter explains the steps required to obtain, install and configure the
Kerberos version 4 software for both Unix machines and Microsoft Windows machines.
Installation and configuration test results are also included. Firewall configuration
requirements are discussed in Section E. Section F explains the steps taken to install and
test an application used by our remote research partner, Professor Glen Wheless, at Old
Dominion University. Execution of the application over a secure channel by Professor
Wheless is the primary indication of a successful Kerberos implementation. Section G
discusses support contracts offered by Cygnus for their Kerberos version 4 distribution.
Section G also explains the specifics and motivation for a customized support contract
Cygnus provided for NPS. Section H details the steps taken to distribute Kerberos
passwords to both local and remote users.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter draws conclusions about Kerberos and makes recommendations
concerning the security of the integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS. Section B presents
our conclusions and Section C presents recommendations for additional and future work.
B. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS
1. STL Site Security
Despite specific items discussed in Chapter VI, site security for the STL is
relatively good. The STL network administrators deserve to be commended for their
superlative technical knowledge, dedication to meeting user requirements, and ability to
succeed despite improper manning. The STL computing staff have installed the latest
security patches for system software, TCPwrapper is used for all intra-campus network
communications, the staff plans to install an automated backup system, and an air
conditioning system is supposed to be installed before the end of the year.
Based on our observation and site security assessment, most security risks for the
STL environment are relatively low. However there are still some vulnerabilities and
deficiencies. Recommendations are provided below.
2. ATM Security
Chapter II demonstrated that ATM can be as susceptible to attack as any other
network technology; security is still a concern when using ATM and fiber optic cables.
ATM technology is immature and new vulnerabilities will likely emerge as experience is
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gained through research such as that conducted by the IIRG at NPS and research testbeds
such as the Monterey BayNet regional ATM network. Much research and testing is still
required before security implications associated with combining ATM with other
networking protocols such as IP are well known. Open communications among the
commercial, scientific and educational communities are essential for discovering and
correcting possible vulnerabilities. Open communications are essential ifATM is to live
up to its much publicized promises. To date, reports by the ATM Forum have been
largely inaccessible and progress by the IETF working group has been incomplete.
3. Kerberos Implementation
We assume that host machines on local-area networks behind a firewall are
relatively secure even though some firewalls are vulnerable to address-spoofing attacks.
We also assume that the network separating the firewalls is insecure. The purpose of our
Kerberos implementation then is to connect two secure hosts across an insecure network
cloud, in this case the Internet. Kerberos is well suited for this task and can be an
effective addition to an organization's network security architecture. Kerberos is
effective against both password-sniffing attacks and address-spoofing attacks. Even if a
an intruder is able to penetrate a firewall using an address-spoofing attack, a "kerberized"
host behind the firewall is secure. Figure 1 8 illustrates the value Kerberos can add value
to the organization's security architecture. However, Kerberos is not widely used and
therefore can be difficult to implement. It is not yet a mature "plug-and-play" software,
but requires considerable effort to install and configure. Implementing Kerberos on a
large scale (such as a campus) requires considerable planning.
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Kerberos Secure Login and Encrypted Packet Transmission
Figure 18. Value of Kerberos within an organization's security architecture.
We limited the scope of this thesis as much as possible from the beginning
because (in our experience) implementation projects are seldom as straightforward as
anticipated. This proved to be true in this case as well. We have been partially successful
with our implementation of Kerberos, but installation and configuration was not as simple
as first anticipated. Configuring and operating Kerberos between Unix platforms is
relatively straightforward and successful, but configuration of Windows clients was
problematic and still has not worked. Our ability to easily operate "kerberized" applica-
tions across the Internet between Windows and Unix is required if Kerberos is to be of
use to NPS.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
1. Related Work: NPS Theses
The IIRG continues to produce numerous significant theses on internetworking.
Thesis security considerations are usually addressed informally. Future IIRG internet-
working theses need to include a separate chapter comprehensively addressing security
issues. Such an approach has been required for all IETF Requests for Comments (RFC)
documents (Postel, 1993).
Restricting access to past or future NPS theses on unclassified network computing
security makes little sense. Restricting access to a thesis simply because it documents
networked computer system security vulnerabilities removes the motivation to improve
security but does not remove the possibility that those vulnerabilities may be exploited.
Access to such theses needs to be unrestricted if effective action is to be taken to improve
networked computer system security.
2. Site Security
a. Administration Issues
The fundamental security concern for an unclassified system is not
necessarily data integrity or confidentiality but rather maintaining system availability.
The STL computing staff must determine and document the system availability require-
ments. They need to conduct a formal risk analysis and prepare detailed contingency
plans for the unclassified systems to ensure that system availability requirements are met.
Additionally an automatic network monitoring system such as is documented in (Ed-
wards, 1996) and (Erdogan, 1996) needs to be implemented.
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The STL computing staff needs to re-examine the current security and
acceptable use policies (AUPs) and revise them where necessary to reflect the current
environment and culture of NPS. A signed consent form acknowledging the security
policies and AUPs ought to be required from all personnel using computing resources at
NPS.
It is recommended the STL computing staff implement a user indoctrina-
tion program for their unclassified systems similar to the program used for their classified
systems. Additionally, it is recommended a first quarter basic computer security course
be required for every student at NPS.
The NPS administration needs to expedite funded STL requests for
additional staff. Six months between staff departure and opening a relief billet is
unacceptably long.
Lastly, documentation concerning the December 1995 computer security
breach at NPS is scarce at best. The NPS computer center staff needs to document and
widely distribute information concerning the break-in. While this is not to say specific
information about the network security architecture at NPS ought to be released, but open
communication between computer system administrators, computer users and the NPS
administration is essential to avoid similar incidents in the future.
b. Environmental Issues
Physical security within the STL can be improved. The main network file
server and the Kerberos authentication/database server are freely accessible to anyone.
These two servers need to be moved to a more physically secure environment. Network
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connections also remain vulnerable. The STL computing staff needs to implement ways
to reduce these vulnerabilities.
c. Software and Data Issues
The STL computing staff needs to utilize a configuration management
program for application software. The most logical control mechanism is some form of
centralized administrative record. At a minimum, the record must include the purpose of
the software, the student or faculty member for whom the application is installed, the
current version, the current location and the expected review or completion date.
Consulting the application log when students depart will allow the STL computing staff
to remove any application programs that are no longer required.
The STL network manager needs to accelerate implementation of an
automated backup mechanism. With an automated system, complete system backups can
be performed monthly with incremental backups performed weekly. Backups must
include user data files as well as system files.
d. Telecommunications and System Access Issues
Password security over the Internet remains a significant vulnerability.
This vulnerability affects all systems on campus, not just those in the STL. Despite the
installation and configuration challenges we experienced, Kerberos is a promising option
that should be explored further. NPS also needs to consider implementing a one-time
password (OTP) protocol (such as S-Key) for dial-up connections.
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3. ATM
IfATM research and implementation at NPS continues, NPS needs to seek
membership in the ATM Forum. With an emphasis on practical networking and internet-
working, the IIRG and other researchers at NPS can be a powerful voice in the develop-
ment of interoperable ATM standards.
4. Kerberos
Although the campus network security architecture now includes a firewall and
the use of TCP wrapper for all intra-campus network communications, the network is
still vulnerable to password-sniffing by undetected sniffer programs and address-spoof-
ing. Kerberos version 4 effectively reduces this vulnerability but it is not without its own
weaknesses. Many of these weaknesses have been eliminated in version 5. Therefore
upgrading the limited implementation of Kerberos in the STL to version 5 is a priority.
Continued work is also required with configuring Windows clients.
A final recommendation is for NPS to investigate the feasibility of a campus-wide
implementation of Kerberos. It is safe to assume there will be much resistance to the use
of Kerberos. Implementing Kerberos will require change, and change is never an easy nut
to crack. Much of this resistance is likely to come from system administrators, many of
whom view Kerberos as burdensome and obtrusive. However, configuring and managing
a Kerberos site does not have to be any more burdensome than managing a non-Kerberos
site. It will only become burdensome if system administrators are expected to manage
both independently. Kerberos can be as "unobtrusive" as the standard login sequence;
users will never know the difference.
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It is clear that careful and detailed planning will be essential for a successful
campus-wide implementation of Kerberos. Implementing a commercial version of
Kerberos including technical support will be much less problematic than implementing a
freeware version of the software. NPS needs to investigate such an option.
D. SUMMARY
It is clear that networked computer security is a multifaceted problem, that
encompasses both social and technological issues. This duality was illustrated throughout
this thesis. There remains much work and research to be done in the areas of networking
and networked computer security. This chapter presents conclusions concerning the
security of the integrated IP/ATM LAN/WAN at NPS, ATM security and the Kerberos
authentication and authorization protocol. Recommendations for continued and future
work are also presented. The most significant result presented here is that secure
collaborative networked research by scientists and students distributed around the Internet
is achievable. A small amount of additional work and testing is required to make that
promise a reality.
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APPENDIX A. ON-LINE THESIS DISTRIBUTION
Hypertext markup language (HTML) and PostScript versions of this thesis are available
at:
http://www. stl. nps. navy. miV-iirg/dennis/thesis. html





APPENDIX B. ON-LINE KERBEROS DISTRIBUTION
A. Kerberos Documentation and Software Distribution
Kerberos software is available as freeware but its distribution within the United
States is controlled because of U.S. export restrictions on cryptographic software.




http://www. cygnus. com/product/ens/sources, html
Documentation
http://www. cygnus. com/library/ens/installJoe. html for Unix
http://www. cygnus. com/library/cns/windowstoc. html for Windows
Note: Only version 4 documentation is available. Version
5 documentation is not yet available on-line.
MIT
Obtaining the Software and Documentation
http://athena-dist. mit. edu/pub/kerberos
B. Technical Support
Technical support is not provided with the distribution. Cygnus does offer
technical support for a fee for their distribution of both Kerberos version 4 and version 5.
C. Kerberos Related Papers
An excellent clearing house for Kerberos related papers is at:
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